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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 When I first encountered Ivlita1, a Georgian immigrant in her mid-20s, she was leaning 
against a light post in lower Manhattan checking her text messages.  I offered to take her to lunch 
so we could talk.  She had never been to an Irish pub so I suggested she try a shepherd’s pie. She 
asked me if I was Irish.  “Partly. I think some of my ancestors were Irish, but then I also have 
ancestors from all over Europe. I’m not really sure where they all came from.”  We exchanged 
pleasantries and then I explained to her my research and why I needed her help.   
 To situate myself in this research, I offer the following brief background:  I grew up in 
the Texas Panhandle and then moved to Moscow, Russia after I graduated from college and 
found whatever work I could to live there.  After spending eight months in Moscow, I moved to 
Kiev, Ukraine where my Russian was good enough to help me navigate day-to-day life unless I 
was visiting western parts of the country.  People in the west refused to respond to me in 
Russian.  I had better luck with English in Lvov, where bookstores were bilingual:  Ukrainian 
and Polish. After moving back to the United States, I married into a family from Central Asia.  
They spent their lives in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan but were ethnically a mix of Ukrainian, 
Russian and Tatar.  My ex-husband’s paternal side was Ukrainian, but he identifies himself as 
Russian.  His maternal grandmother came to the Unites States and claimed asylum after leaving 
Tajikistan during the civil war in the 1990s.    In graduate school, I traveled a couple of times to 
Moldova where I conducted research on human trafficking.  There, I would speak Russian but 
                                                           
1 Pseudonyms are used in this dissertation. 
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often was responded to in Moldovan (Romanian).  These personal experiences left me interested 
in how the Soviet period and Russia’s historical role shaped a post-Soviet reality.   
When Ivlita and I talked about ethnicity, she straightened up as if she was ready to 
pounce on what I was about to say.  I explained that I was troubled that so many people, scholars 
and non-scholars alike, tend to call everyone from the former Soviet region “Russian.” I said I 
had wondered if it might be offensive to those who are not.  She let out a sigh and looked 
relieved. “I am NOT Russian. I am Georgian.  Everything about me is Georgian.”   
Ivlita offered an anecdote on why she is offended when someone mistakes her for a Russian. 
During the war (between Russia and Georgia, 2008-2010), I was in my university class 
here in New York and there was a Russian girl who was explaining the war to a Turkish 
guy.  And she said, 'Georgians are beasts.' And I just couldn't contain myself.  I said, 
'Excuse me?' And she said, 'How dare you interrupt my conversation.' And I said, 'How 
dare you talk about my country like that.'  The Russian girl then told me to 'google' it and 
I will understand.  I told her she should be the one to ‘google,’ because I know my 
country's history. 
Ivlita’s mother, Oksana, identifies herself as ethnically Russian, but she also told me that her 
great grandparents were from Poland. I had the opportunity to formally interview Oksana.  She 
shared with me her experience living in Georgia as a Russian, but she also attended college in 
Russia.  In Georgia, she was treated as a Russian, and in Russia, she was treated as a Georgian.  
The description of her experiences, included in the results chapter of this work, suggested that 
she was a person who felt as though she belonged neither here nor there.  
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The Russification of the Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union was a continuation of the Russian empire.  Russian dominance is often 
referred to as Russian chauvinism.  The first official expression of this chauvinism came from 
Stalin during WWII as a battle cry used against the threat of Nazism (Joo, 2008). In an effort to 
colonize newly acquired republics and develop the cohesiveness of the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), Soviet officials compelled Russians to immigrate to other Soviet 
republics.  The ideological intent was to homogenize “Soviet” space so that class and ethnic 
inequalities would disappear.  The “Soviet” identity was, however, highly Russified.  The spread 
of the Russian language, the establishment of Moscow as the political center of control, and the 
urban development of traditionally rural republics using a Russian workforce are examples of 
how the Soviet Union was Russified (Zayonchkovskaya, 2000; Kolsto, 1993).   
According to the 1989 Soviet census, the highest percentages of Russians outside of 
Russia were living in Kazakhstan, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, with the majority 
living in Kazakhstan (Anderson & Silver, 1989).  The flow of Russians to other Soviet republics, 
especially Central Asia and Transcaucasus, slowed by the 1970s and gradually reversed (Dunlop, 
1993; Kolsto, 1993; Korobkov, 2007).   The native populations in Central Asia began to compete 
for higher skilled jobs as they benefited from the Soviet education system. Eventually, the 
natural increase among indigenous populations filled the labor demand that had previously been 
filled by (European) immigrants (Gibson, 1994; Zayonchkovskaya, 2000).  During the late 
Soviet period an affirmative action policy, or hiring practice based on quotas, ensured that 
members of native populations secured local jobs if they were qualified; preferences went to 
titular (ethnicities that matched titles of republics) groups in the republics (Robertson, 1996).  
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With perestroika and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR, pent-up hostilities among 
ethnic groups were uncorked, and this change led to conflicts and war (Korobkov, 2007; 
Sahadeo, 2007). A study in 1990-1991 by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion indicated that 40 percent of people who wanted to return to their titular nations would 
do so for ethnic reasons.  Europeans left non-European republics for multiple reasons.  Some 
believed there would be no future for them in the newly independent republic, others felt 
discriminated against within their own communities, and some fled violence and increasing 
conflict.  Although the return of Russians to Russia was the key post-Soviet migration pattern, 
Gibson (1994) identified the following non-Russian ethnic groups who fled to their titular 
nations or sought refuge elsewhere to avoid persecution and even execution in some cases:  
Uzbeks from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; Kyrgyz from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Tajiks from 
Kyrgyzstan; Armenians from Tajikistan and Azerbaijan; Azeris from Uzbekistan and Armenia; 
South Ossetians from Georgia.   
Today, continued ethnic tension is coupled with rising violence in Russia, especially in 
the big cities (Korobkov, 2007).  Korobkov cited a study by Mukomel (2005) who compared 
opinions among Russians (in Russia) over time. By 2004, 68 percent of Russians had negative 
views regarding non-European immigrants.  Sahadeo (2007) noted the palpable nostalgia his 
informants, ethnic minorities who had migrated to St. Petersburg and Moscow for work, 
expressed for the Soviet era as a result of the rising xenophobia in Russia today.  He also referred 
to a study conducted by Moscow State University that revealed that anti-Semitism is being 
overshadowed by bigotry towards non-white ethnic groups in Russia.  Among Muscovites 
polled, 46 percent had negative feelings towards Azeris, 40 percent towards Chechens, 33 
percent towards Georgians and Roma (“Gypsies”), and 8 percent towards Jews.   
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Emigration from the Former Soviet Union to the U.S. 
About 1.5 million people emigrated from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1992 (the 
year of the collapse of the USSR). At least half of these emigrants were Soviet Jews (Fassmann 
and Munz, 1994).  The first significant wave was in the 1970s after the U.S. agreed to lift some 
trade barriers in exchange for the Soviet government lifting travel restrictions.  The second 
significant wave started in 1987.  The main destination countries were Israel, the U.S. and 
Germany.  Many of these emigrants were encouraged and supported by Jewish communities in 
the receiving countries (Dietz, Lebok, & Polian, 2002).  It is also important to note that during 
the 1970s and 1980s, because they were entering the U.S. as refugees, former Soviet immigrants 
had access to formal state support (welfare) on top of any local community support they 
received.  I summarize below the results from reports by Kochavi (2005) and Lazarowitz (2003) 
on Soviet immigration to the U.S.  They found that Jews were the main target of U.S. policy on 
migration, and Jews had a strong incentive to leave the Soviet Union.  . 
 Soviet Jewish immigration to the U.S. Kochavi (2005) and Lazarowitz (2003) provide 
historical sketches about Soviet-U.S. relations on migration during the Soviet period.  This 
section reviews their articles together to present the mix of norms, processes and events that 
influenced Jewish migration flows from the former USSR to the U.S.  Anti-Semitism was deeply 
embedded in tsarist Russia.  The Bolsheviks tempered this prejudice, but Stalin reinforced it.  For 
example, passports issued to Jews indicated their nationality as “Jew,” but they were not granted 
territorial autonomy or other “amenities” that were granted to other nationalities.  Although 
external concern grew about the treatment of Soviet Jews, before the 1960s, American Jews were 
more concerned with the U.S. Civil Rights movement.  Soviet Jewish issues were not on the 
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official agenda of U.S-Soviet relations before 1969 in part because Israel was not advocating for 
Soviet Jewish emigration at that time.    
The American effort to alter the fate of Soviet Jews began to gain traction in the mid-
1960s with Jewish student movements.  In 1965, Congress followed; Senators Javits, Ribicoff 
and Dodd submitted a resolution about the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, including an 
exorbitant “exit” tax placed on Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate that effectively prevented them 
from leaving the USSR.  Though the resolution passed the Senate but was dropped by a House-
Senate conference committee, the exit tax became the incentive for the next congressional action 
which was the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act.  
Senator Javits, a ranking member of the Joint Economic Committee and an active 
supporter of Jewish organizations and causes, used his influence and knowledge about the 
USSR’s grain production problems brought on by collectivized farming to help Senator Jackson 
and Representative Vanik draft an amendment to the 1974 Trade Act.  After Stalin initiated 
collectivization in the late 1920s, Russia and Ukraine, which were net exporters of grain under 
the Imperial regime, became net importers of grain under the Soviet regime.  This new reality 
made the USSR especially vulnerable to poor harvests, which in turn made the country 
particularly reliant on Western grain in times of crisis.  This situation became apparent during a 
summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev.  The Soviet Union had had one of its worst wheat 
harvests in almost a decade and needed American grain.  Under the proposed Jackson-Vanik 
amendment, any country that denies or restricts emigration cannot get “most favored nation” 
(MFN) status.  Countries denied MFN are subject to high tariffs and other trade barriers.  
Nixon’s administration tried but failed to block the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment.  
Kissinger and Nixon believed they should not link US foreign policy to Soviet domestic policy, 
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but should engage in “quiet diplomacy” in a push for détente.  Ironically, Kissinger gave credit to 
the Nixon administration as the leader on Soviet Jewish emigration.  For example, the 1970 
Leningrad trials spotlighted the Soviet treatment of Jews.  In 1970, eleven Jews were put on trial 
for attempting to hijack a plane and escape Russia, but this incident led to the arrest of around 
forty additional Jews as part of the conspiracy.  This is one of the few times Kissinger intervened 
directly on behalf of Soviet Jews, and he was able to get their death penalties commuted.  More 
often, Kissinger was a proponent of order over justice.  In fact, he used the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment as a bargaining chip during the Yom Kippur War, indicating that the U.S. would 
further support Israel if American Jews would back off the Jackson-Vanik amendment. 
It became increasingly difficult for the Nixon administration to resist the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment.  First, the amendment was popular within the American public in general, partly 
because of the belief that the U.S. is not only a nation of immigrants but also a safe-haven for 
persecuted persons across the world. Second, the Watergate scandal weakened the 
administration’s ability to resist the amendment.  They could not afford to alienate their 
remaining Jewish constituency.  Although Nixon’s administration was able to stall the 
amendment, it failed to block it. Gerald Ford finally signed it into law in 1975 (Kochavi, 2005; 
Lazarowitz, 2003).   
The following anecdote exemplifies a fairly typical Soviet immigrant from that period, 
but who is very different from most recent FSU immigrants.  After one of my trips to New York 
City for data collection, I was headed back to LaGuardia Airport in a taxi.  The driver was 
friendly, and we chatted about what I was doing in Brooklyn.  “Ah, the Soviet Ghetto!”  My 
driver perked up when I told him I was in Brighton Beach for research.  “You know, I was 
recruited into a group that was responsible for bringing attention to the U.S. about what Soviet 
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Jews were facing in the 1970s, but we didn’t get credit for it because a lot of Jews and Jewish 
leaders didn’t want to be associated with such a radical group.”  I asked, “What group was that?”  
He responded, “The JDL.”  He looked at me for some sign of recognition.  Seeing none, he 
clarified, “The Jewish Defense League2.”  He told me:  
My father was born in Lithuania and survived the Holocaust.  My mother was born in 
Poland, but she escaped Poland before Hitler invaded.  Her father served in the Soviet 
Army for five years, and they didn’t see him for a couple of years during his service.  I 
had a difficult time in Russia because I am Jewish.  My family first moved to Israel, and 
then to New York (City) when I was 14.   
He called himself an “ex-immigrant,” and talked about the difficulty he had in school in the U.S. 
And even though New York City “is a very liberal place,” he was bullied because he was an 
immigrant and Jewish.  He explained that about a quarter of the students in his high school were 
immigrants.  He noted his surprise because the students who picked on him were the sons and 
daughters of immigrants.  He got in a lot of fights.   
 Because at least half of the immigrants from the USSR was Jewish until the collapse of 
the USSR (Fassmann and Munz, 1994), it makes sense that the focus of research on former 
Soviet immigrants has been on the Jewish population.   However, since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the flow has become more diverse.  Dr. Sam Kliger with the Research Institute for New 
Americans (RINA) conducts polls among the Russian-speaking population in New York.  He 
found that the percentage of non-Jews among Russian speakers in New York increased rapidly 
over the past several years.  According to their polls, non-Jews make up about 30-35 percent of 
                                                           
2 The Jewish Defense League is listed on the Southern Poverty Law Center’s website in the “Intelligence Files” as a 
prominent extremist group in the United States.  www. http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-
files/groups/jewish-defense-league 
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the Russian-speaking population, but he suspects this percentage is higher if undocumented 
immigrants are included (Personal communication, May 17, 2010; Ruby, 2007).   Motivations 
for Jews to leave the former Soviet Union (FSU) because of anti-Semitism may have decreased 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Sahadeo, 2007).   
Liebert (2010) is the only scholar to study labor migration from any part of the FSU to 
the U.S.  Her regional focus was Central Asia.  She indicated that since 2000, the migration trend 
from the Central Asia increasingly became one of irregular migration.  Irregular migration is an 
increase in temporary and/or undocumented migration. One of my research goals is to show the 
diversity of reasons for migration and experiences upon immigration to the U.S.  Ivilta and her 
family’s experience provides one story about motivation for emigration from the FSU.  Davit, 
her father, who identifies himself as Georgian, explained their experience.        
In the Soviet period, you could not own property.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
people became millionaires overnight because they were trying to get control of factories.  
You had to be very smart to survive.  I was an engineer in the Soviet period and I had a 
good salary.  After the collapse, I had to do something else.  The U.S. had this system of 
distribution so I took the idea and implemented it in the city.  We distributed goods from 
warehouses to stores.  It was very small at first, but got bigger.  The government stepped 
in, said they wanted half our business.  In Russia now, too, there is huge corruption.  
There was no tax system, but you had to pay the government.  My partner was shot and 
killed by the KGB because we refused to give the government and police half our 
business.   
Ivlita later told me that her mother was arrested and put in prison for two days because they 
would not give up the business.  The government took everything they had, including their car 
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and apartment.  Ivlita’s parents fled to the U.S. and she and her brother stayed behind, but they 
had to hide.  They left the protection of their aunt’s home only with an escort. 
 At the time of my research in Brooklyn, Ivlita was in university.  Her father was working 
as a limo driver and her mother worked as a home healthcare worker.  They, along with Ivlita’s 
younger brother, shared a small but comfortable apartment in Sheepshead Bay in Brooklyn, one 
of the two neighborhoods in Brooklyn where there is a concentration of immigrants from former 
Soviet republics.  Their narrative is a good example of how history and context interact to 
influence the lived experience of immigrants.  More specifically, refugee status, titularity 
(ethnicity and country of origin match), and ethnic identity are all categories under which I 
organized my hypotheses for research.  These are the organizing categories that were intended to 
help me explore why people left their respective former Soviet republic and how they integrate 
into U.S. society.   
 Many scholars have made important contributions to the study of former Soviet 
immigrants in the United States, but I broaden the scope of research on FSU immigrants in the 
U.S. to include an alternative understanding of this population. I argue that it is crucial not only 
to understand this population in the context of the former Soviet region, but to recognize their 
diversity and plurality. My research is a foundational study of the diverse FSU immigrant 
population, but it employs established, though in some cases contested, theories of migration.   
 Birman and Trickett (2001) noted the lack of research on former Soviet immigrants in the 
U.S.  Kopnina (2005) called former Soviet immigrants in Europe an “invisible population” for 
multiple reasons. One of those reasons she identified is that they “choose” to be invisible.  Also, 
structurally they are invisible because many are white, and they do not tend to live in 
concentration (ethnic enclaves).  This appears to be true in the U.S. with some notable 
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exceptions, such as Brighton Beach in Brooklyn, New York.  Liebert (2010) recently attempted 
to fill the gap in research on immigrants from former Soviet republics noting that her study was 
the first on labor migration from the Former Soviet Union (mostly Central Asia) to the U.S.  
Most previous studies involving FSU immigrants focused on Jewish refugees.   
 My research seeks to determine how the Soviet legacy affects the lived experiences of 
immigrants from the FSU in the U.S.  The Soviet legacy compelled me to treat the region as a 
whole even though the USSR collapsed into independent nations. After 1991, individual 
republics declared independence from the Soviet Union and reorganized their governments and 
economies accordingly.  Many of the reforms that took place led to economic and political 
crises, which brought Russia (voluntarily or involuntarily), the dominant power during the Soviet 
era, back into the domestic sphere of newly independent states.  Multiple regional organizations 
(e.g. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Eurasian Economic Community (EEC); 
GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova)) draw together former Soviet republics in 
economic and political cooperation.  One reason for the persistent post-Soviet interdependence is 
the legacy of the regional command economy before 1990.  Industrialization and inter-republic 
migration united the physical, economic and social infrastructure of the Soviet Union.  Today, 
migration patterns, trade, investment, and even military presence keep these independent 
republics interdependent (Lee, Sacks, Kaiser, & Heleniak, 1993; Metcalf, 1997; Sabonis-Helf, 
2007; Secrieru, 2006). 
 My work is intended to reach three broad audiences:  migration scholars and non-
migration scholars studying any former Soviet population, and non-scholars working in 
governmental and non-governmental organizations who may interact with former Soviet 
populations. An additional outcome of this research is the launch of a bi-lingual (Russian and 
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English) website with study findings and helpful links intended to reach immigrants from former 
Soviet republics3.  These varied audiences are engaged further in the discussion chapter, but 
generally, my research is intended to fill gaps and further clarify or challenge existing academic 
literature and public understanding of the FS population.  More specifically, results of this 
research challenge scholars and non-scholars alike to move beyond general classifications of 
persons from the FSU as “Russian.”  Furthermore, I argue that a historical and regional 
contextual understanding of immigrants is crucial to a broader understanding of the immigrant 
population.  With this work, I highlight the existing research on former Soviet immigrants and 
advance scholarship and action efforts affecting this population.   
 
 
  
  
                                                           
3 The website was made possible by a generous grant from Vanderbilt Graduate School and Peabody College in the 
form of a “Dissertation Enhancement Grant.”  The website for this study is:  www.fsimmigrants.com 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The theoretical literature on migration studies falls into two broad categories:  social 
capital and migration theories.  Social capital and migration theories are synergistic.  Social 
capital is embedded in the motivations for push/pull and incorporation theories of migration.  
Social capital is especially important for immigrant populations as they often lack access to 
economic capital.  Although former Soviet populations generally have strong cultural/human 
capital in the form of education, the production and utilization of formal social capital, such as 
the engagement in civil society, has been weaker.  Social capital operates differently in the 
Soviet and post-Soviet context in comparison to the U.S. context, and therefore, it is an 
important literature to engage for this study.  Social capital is fundamental in migration processes 
and is used by former Soviet populations. 
Social Capital and the FSU 
Bourdieu (1986) defined social capital as, “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that 
accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” (p. 119).  He offered the 
example of “Soviet-type societies,” where social capital is actualized through political spheres 
rather than economic means. For Bourdieu, to gain access to resources one must have position in 
society and access to power.  Class and other socioeconomic and political affiliations are 
avenues that facilitate one’s possession of symbolic and cultural capital.  This in turn affects how 
well one can access and benefit from social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992).  Another way to understand social capital is that it is created by social actors who engage 
in relationships that facilitate some sort of action that produces access to resources (Coleman 
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1988).  This social infrastructure produces a resource that individuals can use to meet their own 
interests, but the production of that resource is carried out collectively.  Not every actor 
producing social capital benefits from it equally.  The concept of obligation, then, helps explain 
this uneven application of social capital.    
Obligation can be foundational for informal social capital; it is an easy way to initiate 
exchanges that begin to produce social capital.   A does a favor for B, and A trusts that B will 
reciprocate.  After A’s favor, B has an obligation to A.  People in higher social positions 
accumulate obligations owed to them.  Usually these are people who have access to wealth or 
relationships so that they can give or promise favors (Coleman, 1988).  Coleman claimed that 
closed social networks, networks that are insular, produce the most social capital. However, 
closed social networks may produce vertical and hierarchical networks in which power is 
concentrated upwards (Putnam, 1993). If civil society is weak and does not encourage open, 
varied and horizontal social networks, closed networks may be the only option.    
From a community perspective, Perkins, Hughey, and Speer (2002) and DeFilippis 
(2001) provide understanding of how social capital operates, and why it is important.   DeFilippis 
(2001) critiqued Putnam’s conception of social capital because it does not adequately address the 
role of power.  DeFilippis, like Bourdieu, argued that one must be able to access economic 
and/or political power to actualize social capital effectively.  For example, social networks that 
create social capital do exist in low-income communities, but this does not necessarily improve 
the lives of the actors who are engaged in the network.  “What they lack is power and the capital 
that partially constitutes that power.” (p. 801).   
Perkins et al. (2002) were concerned with how social capital is measured and understood. 
They addressed the hesitancy among community psychologists to engage actively with this 
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concept.  Therefore, they attempted to concretize it and explicitly parsed out the individual and 
collective dimensions of social capital.  Also, they highlighted the difference between formal 
(bridging) and informal (bonding) functions of social capital.  For community development to 
occur, they argued, more emphasis should be placed on formal rather than informal social capital 
development.   
Soviet and post-Soviet social capital  
It seems that informal social capital is relied on more than formal social capital within 
former Soviet communities.  For example, Kopnina (2005) found that former Soviet immigrants 
in London and Amsterdam do not operate in communities but subcommunities.  Subcommunities 
are more fragmented and particularistic than traditional communities.  Informal, hierarchical, and 
closed networks are used by organized crime, whose activity has been on the rise since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  In his seminal work on social capital, Putnam (1993) claimed that 
“Palermo may represent the future of Moscow” (p. 183).  What he meant by this is that Moscow, 
like Palermo in southern Italy, does not have a tradition of civic engagement.  Norms of trust and 
reciprocity beyond the family unit are weak.  Putnam suggested that social capital was very 
limited before the Soviet era, but the authoritarian rule during the Soviet era destroyed whatever 
social capital was left from the Imperial era. 
During the early to mid-Soviet period, there was an intentional destruction (from exile to 
execution) of symbolic and cultural capital (Tomusk, 2000). These forms of capital are important 
because they are sources of power, how the elite reproduce their class, and how they maintain 
their division/status (Bourdieu, 1986).  Symbolic capital may be referred to as prestige (such as 
family name), and cultural capital may be understood as a learned competency.  Both are forms 
of human capital that an individual possesses, but they possess this capital because of their 
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position in a society based on their social, political or economic standing.  The Soviets, in their 
push to liberate the exploited classes, not only tried to destroy symbolic and cultural capital, but 
they also implemented an affirmative action system to promote those from collectives and 
industrial backgrounds in society.  Some famous examples of this are Stalin, Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev, all of whom came from humble origins and educations (Tomusk, 2000).  Although 
formal social capital generated through civic engagement, for example, may be more easily 
detected and therefore destroyed by the State, informal social capital generated through peer and 
family networks is hard to monitor and destroy.  Informal social capital became an important 
mechanism not only for upward mobility but for survival. However, the Soviet regime tried to 
control private life.  From the 1920s until the “thaw” of the mid-1950s after Stalin’s death, 
private life was essentially non-existent for Soviet citizens.  Communal living and the 
“collective” were the logic of this time.  Community members self-regulated by surveilling and 
reporting on one another.  Private life was underground or in the very intimate “kitchen” sphere 
(Zdravomyslova & Voronkov, 2002).  This is an important legacy for the post-Soviet period.   
Several scholars researched social capital in the FSU, but focused on Russia (Bahry, et 
al., 2005; Cook, 2003; Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998; Marsh, 2002; Petro, 2001; 
Stephenson, 2001).  Rose (1995) best explains the uniqueness of social capital in the FSU.  He 
refers to Russia as an “hour glass society.” Those in power in Russia interacted with others in 
power.  The majority of the citizenry relied on itself to fulfill much of its day-to-day needs 
leaving a very small opening in between the power holders and non-power holders for interaction 
and collaboration.  The gap between the citizenry and the State created an hour-glass shaped 
society.  This hour-glass society phenomenon can be applied to other post-Soviet states as well.  
An authoritarian regime led citizens to create horizontal networks so that they were less reliant 
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on the state to fulfill their daily needs.  In an hour-glass society, there are strong informal 
networks among trusted friends.  When people are in trouble, for example, they do not rely on 
the authorities to solve their problems, but they turn to their networks.  This may be true in many 
societies, but it is especially pronounced in the FSU where the legacy of the Soviet state’s 
authoritarian rule and promotion of a nomenclature created this hour-glass division.  I refer to the 
informal, community-level, intimate social capital in the context of the FSU as “kitchen social 
capital”.   
Migration Theories 
 Migration is a “permanent or semi-permanent change of residence” (Lee, 1966, p. 49).  
Because migration is a global phenomenon, migration scholarship has vast theoretical and 
empirical literatures.  Migration theory includes two big umbrella categories: push/pull theories 
and incorporation theories.  These are interrelated; motives for migration can influence 
adjustment processes (Berry, 1997). This section weaves established migration theories (Tables 1 
and 3) into the empirical English-language research conducted on FSU immigrants.   
Push/pull theories in empirical studies of FSU immigrants.   
 Lee (1966) referred to Ravenstein (1885, 1889, cited in Lee, 1966), a British geographer, 
as the original migration theorist.  Although his “laws” of migration have been criticized, Lee 
indicated that Ravenstein’s laws were the most consistent over the years.  The six specific laws 
are interesting to consider in the context of history. 1) Migration is a gradual process; 2) most 
migrants travel short distances; 3) migration currents produce weaker counter-migration currents; 
4) migration produces urban centers; 5) females dominate migration streams; and 6) migration 
increases as society advances (Raventstein, 1889).  
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 These laws are embedded in the push/pull theories of migration, or they can be referred to 
as reactive/proactive behaviors. Massey et al. (1993) offer a modern formulation of push/pull 
motivators for migration.  Their summary includes not only individual motivations for migration, 
but also the structural realties that shape migration flows.  The theories are more developed and 
sophisticated, but they are generally consistent with Ravenstein’s laws.  Massey and colleagues 
reviewed the most prominent migration theories, and I use their structure to organize my 
overview below (Table 1).  They divided theories into “initiation” and “perpetuation” categories. 
I include two other theories not reviewed by Massey and colleagues or mentioned by many other 
migration scholars in discussions of push/pull migration:  the sojourn and forced migration 
theories.  All theories of migration help explain experiences of immigrants, but for this study 
neoclassical and institutional theories are the most helpful.    
 With the exception of Liebert’s (2010) book on labor migration from the FSU to the U.S., 
I have not been able to locate English-language empirical studies on former Soviet immigrants 
that focus on the push/pull reasons for migration from the FSU.   According to Liebert, economic 
reasons are the main push for people to emigrate from the FSU.  These economic reasons include 
income maximization (neoclassical economic theory) and risk minimization (new economics of 
migration) in the country of origin.   
The neoclassical theory of migration assumes that the primary reason for migration is 
income maximization.  Individuals migrate from less to more developed countries if the expected 
income gain from the move is positive (Todaro, 1969).  This was the case with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  Exit restrictions limited the number of emigrants from the Soviet Union.  
However, when the USSR broke up and economic crises ensued in almost every republic, the 
rate of migration from the FSU to the U.S. increased dramatically.  One key difference between 
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neoclassical theory and new economics of migration is the actor.  Under neoclassical theory, the 
economic actor can be the individual or family unit.  Under the new economics of migration, the 
economic actor is the individual, but the economic decision-maker is the family unit. 
Table 1:  Push/pull theories of migration 
Theory Key Contributor(s) Key concepts 
Initiation: 
Neoclassical 
Economics 
Todaro (1969); 
Borjas (1994) 
Migration driven by income maximization 
New Economics of 
Migration 
Stark & Bloom 
(1985) 
Migration driven by risk minimization 
Dual Labor Market Piore (1979); Sassen 
(2001) 
Migration driven by labor market structure 
The Sojourn Hamilton (1985) Migration driven by desire to explore the 
world 
Forced Migration Lee (1966); Castles 
(2003) 
Migration driven by force or perceptions of 
force  
World Systems Wallerstein (1974); 
Chase-Dunn (1997); 
Massey (1988) 
Migration driven by globalization and state 
relationships 
Perpetuation: 
Network Boyd (1989); Smith 
(1996) 
Migration patterns influenced by community-
level social capital development 
Institutional Zolberg (1989); 
Shelley (2003); 
Liebert (2010) 
Migration patterns caused by informal and 
formal institutional relationships 
Cumulative 
Causation 
Massey et al. (1987); 
Fussel and Massey 
(2004) 
Migration patterns caused by migration  
Migration Systems Massey et al. (1993) Migration patterns caused by globalization 
and state relationships  
 
Remittances play an important role for risk minimization for a family.  Remittances 
provide an additional source of income for households in the origin country, and they can 
become a source of economic development in the community of origin (Taylor, Rozelle, and de 
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Brauw, 2003).  Insights from the new economics of migration help us understand household risk 
minimization strategies in post-Soviet states because of the collapse (or severe weakening) of 
their welfare system, for example the pension system (Anderson and Becker, 1999).  In my 
study, informants were able to express this strategy via current household composition and the 
practice of sending home remittances.   
Migration among former Soviet populations increasingly has become temporary because 
migrants are able to keep closer ties to home through advances in technology (White, 2007).  
Liebert (2010) also noted that migration flows from the FSU to New York are becoming more 
irregular.  This “irregular” migration refers to both illegal and temporary migration.  However, 
ethnicity and titular status may matter because, after 1990, nationalism grew in virtually all 
former Soviet republics.  Many non-titular groups did not feel connected to the newly 
independent states.  For example, a study conducted on emigration from the Kyrgyz Republic 
found that Europeans were more willing to emigrate permanently from Kyrgystan than were 
ethnic Kyrgyz during the post-Soviet period.  Kyrgyz respondents expressed an interest in 
migrating temporarily for work in order to earn money abroad, and then they could return home 
to live (Agadjanian, Nedoluzhkov, & Kumskov, 2008).   
In his seminal work on economic migration theory, Borjas (1989) noted that 1965 
immigration reform had a profound impact on the work and earning potential of immigrants 
coming into the U.S.  Under the 1965 reform, visa allocation shifted and was primarily based on 
kinship rather than skill or education level of applicants.  One of his conclusions was that the 
safety-net a family provides for an immigrant insures against unemployment or 
underemployment.  Essentially, “the kinship regulations in the immigration law create a lower 
bound in the income levels that low skilled immigrants can attain in the United States, and hence 
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make it more likely that immigrants are negatively selected from the population.” (p. 470).  In 
other words, his argument appears to imply that kinship creates an economic buffer to allow for 
less skilled workers to immigrate.   
Borjas (1994) used a “rational choice” model to explain why migration flows from less to 
more economically developed nations, and to discuss the effects of this migration.  He argued 
that in the U.S., the skill levels of immigrants have decreased over time due to a change in the 
country (i.e. economy) of origin for the majority of immigrants.  Though not his main thesis, he 
also was concerned about the extent to which unskilled immigrants participate in welfare 
programs while paying less in taxes.  He was concerned that immigrants can “exacerbate the 
ethnic wage differentials already in existence in the host country” (p. 1667).   
The study of former Soviet immigrants to the U.S. may further clarify Borjas’s 
neoclassical approach to immigration.  Liebert’s (2010) application of institutional theory (see 
below) expands on an important structural element.  The institutional effect may explain that the 
“low-skill level” of immigrants coming from less developed countries is actually a result of 
deskilling.  Deskilling happens when an immigrant’s employment and/or education credentials 
are not realized in the country of destination.  For example, a physician from Dushanbe 
(Tajikistan) may become a cab driver in New York City.   Persons who leave their countries of 
origin are not among the poorest persons there; it takes resources, including support from family 
and friends, to move to a new country.  Borjas does not necessarily ignore the role of institutions 
in migration.  However, Liebert’s focus on institutional theory better explains the relationship 
between individuals and institutions in the migration process. 
Liebert used institutional theory in her study of immigrants from the FSU in New York.  
Formal institutions include passport agencies, banks, and employment agencies,   Informal 
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institutions include social networks, loan sharks, passport agency employees who break rules, 
and unlicensed employment agencies.  These formal and informal institutions can conflict with 
each other or be compatible, but conflict depends on the effectiveness of the formal institutions 
and the compatibility of their goals.  Liebert (2010) cited Helmke and Levitsky’s (2003) 
typology of formal/informal institution relationships.  Table 2 lays out this typology.  When 
formal institutions are effective, there is less need for informal institutions to absorb unmet 
demand for whatever the formal institution is supposed to offer.  Laws, for example, are less 
likely to be broken if formal institutions operate effectively, even if informal institutions have 
conflicting goals with formal institutions.  Where formal institutions are ineffective, informal 
institutions with compatible goals can substitute.  Liebert (2010) noted that immigrants from the 
FSU are deskilled because of ineffective formal institutions.  For example, if governments are 
not effective at meeting the demand for work visas, individuals may immigrate illegally, but they 
will still look for work.  Informal institutions, such as underground unemployment agencies, help 
find that person work.  The individual’s legal status limits the type of work they do and it makes 
them more vulnerable to abuses.    Education corruption may be another form of institutional 
deskilling to consider for this population.  A study by Heyneman, Anderson and Nuraliyeva 
(2008) confirmed what many scholars suspected and that was the increasing prevalence of 
corruption in post-Soviet education systems.  One impact of corruption is a devaluation of 
education in the form of a negative reputation of the degree granting institution and/or 
disincetivizing students to learn if they can bribe instead.   
 Liebert uses Kyrgyzstan as a good example of how the institutional substitutive 
relationship operates.  The Kyrgyz government largely ignores unlicensed employment agencies 
because they facilitate migration out of Kyrgyzstan when formal institutions are not able to keep 
23 
 
up with this demand.  This helps decrease Kyrgyzstan’s high unemployment rate.  Formal 
institutions are ineffective in this case, but the goals of the formal and informal institutions are 
compatible and the institutions create a pipeline of sorts between Kyrgyzstan and the US (New 
York).  Liebert cites a plurality of social reasons for migration such as domestic violence, 
political instability/harassment, and the hope to find better educational opportunities for children. 
Table 2:  Formal and Informal Institutional Compatibility 
  Compatibility of Goals 
Effectiveness of 
Formal Institution 
 Compatible Conflicting 
Effective Complementary Accommodating 
Ineffective Substitutive  Competing  
 
 Once an emigrant becomes an immigrant, a process of adjustment or incorporation into 
the receiving country ensues.  I use the term “incorporation” because I feel it subsumes multiple 
terms used to describe the adjustment process, such as assimilation and acculturation. These 
terms are defined below. The majority of studies of immigrants from the FSU focus on 
incorporation into U.S. society.  Liebert (2010), Morawksa (2004), and Kasinitz et al. (2008) 
looked at assimilation, and the other studies are more focused on acculturation processes and 
problems among former Soviet populations (Birman & Trickett, 2001; Cutler, 2008; 
Kishinevsky, 2004; Miller et al., 2006; Trickett & Birman, 2005; Vinokurov, Birman & Trickett, 
2000).  
Incorporation theories in empirical studies of FS immigrants.   
 There are several spheres of incorporation:  cultural, social, economic, political, and 
spatial.  Incorporation theories can be categorized under two labels:  assimilation/acculturation 
and transnationalism.  Assimilation and acculturation are used interchangeably, but Gans (1997) 
provided a clarification of these terms.    He noted that, in general, acculturation is a quicker 
process that relates to an individual’s norms, beliefs, and values that are related to a particular 
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cultural group.  Thus, it is more within the control of the individual to acculturate.  However, 
there are strong external influences.  For example, even though other populations have their own 
popular culture, American culture remains a dominant force in the world.  American mass 
culture has pushed American cultural trends across the globe, priming individuals before they 
move to the U.S.  Assimilation is more of a macro level process that refers to an entire immigrant 
group and how members of the group incorporate into society as a whole.  Assimilation is less 
within the control of the individual.  Therefore, it is a slower process. 
 “Transnationalism” implies strong feelings of attachment to an immigrant’s country of 
origin.  Morawska (2004) defines transnationalism as immigrants’ regular involvement with 
happenings in the country of origin. That is a broad statement, but at this point in the theory’s 
development, it may be the best approach. “Happenings” in the country of origin can be in the 
economic, political, social, cultural, and/or religious spheres of society (Levitt and Jaworsky, 
2007).  Assimilation, acculturation and transnationalism are not mutually exclusive categories.  
Furthermore, Morawska (2004) argues that acculturation and transnationalism should be 
understood in relation to one another rather than as parallel processes.   Assimilation and 
acculturation are two sides of the same coin, and transnationalism is the edging of that coin.  
Table 3 offers a summary of these various theories and key contributors to each theory.   
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Table 3:  Incorporation theories of migration 
Theory Key Contributor(s) Key Concepts 
Assimilation/Acculturation 
Straight-Line Gordon (1965); 
Berry (1997) 
As immigrants incorporate into country of 
destination, they drop country of origin 
identity and practices. 
New Mainstream Alba and Nee 
(1997, 2004) 
As immigrants incorporate into country of 
destination, they might maintain country 
of origin identity and practices and 
influence the mainstream of country of 
destination  
Segmented Portes and Zhou 
(1993); Birman 
(1994) 
As immigrants incorporate into country of 
destination their process may be upward or 
downward 
Adhesive/Ossification Morawska (2004); 
Levitt (2009) 
As immigrants incorporate into country of 
destination, they may become insular and 
freeze in time country of origin identity 
and practices 
Transnationalism 
Transnationalism Portes, Guarnizo 
and Landolt (1999); 
Morawska (2004) 
As immigrants incorporate into country of 
destination, they maintain engagement 
with country of origin in economic, 
political, social, cultural, and/or religious 
spheres of society. 
 
 “Russian Jews”4 in Philadelphia follow an “ethnic-adhesive” assimilation/transnational 
path (Morawska, 2004).  This means that they are an insular group, and they are oriented to their 
ethnic community.  However, they are not connected to their country of origin (a former Soviet 
republic), so they are host-society oriented rather than home-society focused.  They are not 
transnationally engaged.   
 Liebert (2010) showed that former Soviet immigrants increasingly take low-skilled jobs 
that have typically been occupied by less educated immigrants from Mexico and Central 
                                                           
4 I use the terms the authors of the study used.  However, I also include quotation marks to indicate that I find the 
term problematic.  For example, in Morawska’s study, she noted that her sample included Ukrainian Jews, but 
referred to her whole sample as “Russian Jews.”   
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America; these jobs include housekeeping and construction.  The employment in low-skilled 
jobs results in the deskilling of the immigrant group.   Because the Soviet Union created a well-
developed education infrastructure, populations from the former Soviet republics are highly 
educated.  Current former Soviet immigrants in New York pick up jobs that are below their 
education and skill level. Although Liebert focused on Central Asian immigrants (she is 
Kyrgyz), she also referred to European and Transcaucasian ethnic groups in her study, such as 
Russians and Georgians.   
 Kasinitz et al. (2008) included the Russian-speaking Jewish population in New York in 
their comparative analysis of second-generation immigrants and native populations.  Other 
groups included Chinese, Dominicans, “South Americans,” West Indians, Puerto Ricans, native 
whites, and native blacks.   They found that Russian-speaking Jews (along with Chinese) are the 
least likely to vote or be politically active even though they are the most economically successful 
of all groups.  One reason for this behavior is that Russian immigrants who are more threatened 
by downward assimilation are more likely to organize and become politically active.  and Jews 
are not threatened, right? 
 More research has been done on the acculturation processes of former Soviet immigrants, 
especially Jewish populations, in the U.S.  Empirical studies indicate that these populations can 
become insular, for example in Philadelphia and New York, which can result in negative 
psychological outcomes (Miller et al., 2006; Morawska, 2004; Vinukorov, Birman, & Trickett, 
2000).  However, Morawska only referred to the insular nature of this population in Philadelphia; 
she did not study psychological outcomes.  Miller et al. (2006) made an indirect link between a 
lack of acculturation and depression.  Feelings of isolation from the host community increase 
stress, and additional stress increases the risk for depression.   
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 Vinukorov, Birman and Trickett (2000) compared employment status and psychological 
adaptation in two communities (Brighton Beach, New York and Washington D.C. suburbs) 
among Russian-speaking refugees.  This sample was interesting in that 74.3% of their sample 
identified themselves as Jewish, but 62.6% of their sample claimed to have no religion, 
suggesting that Jewish was an ethnic rather than religious identification.  The authors considered 
three employment statuses:  unemployed, underemployed and employed.  If immigrants were 
“employed,” that meant that they were employed in occupations similar to their occupations in 
their country of origin and commensurate with their education and skill levels.  Those employed 
reported more life satisfaction than those underemployed.  The underemployed reported more 
life satisfaction than the unemployed.  The community context mattered.  The more acculturated 
to American society, the better access to employment opportunities.  They found that immigrants 
in Brighton Beach were more insular (less acculturated to American society) and less likely to be 
employed.  This example suggests that former Soviet refugees in more insular communities are 
less likely to be employed and, therefore, less likely to be satisfied with life.  They experience 
more long-term adjustment problems than other immigrants.   
 Dina Birman and Edison Trickett have been especially active investigating the 
experiences of Jewish refugees from the FSU.  One interesting finding is their support of 
Gordon’s (1964, cited in Birman & Trickett, 2001) idea of zero-sum adaptation.  As people 
acculturate (behavior, language and identity) to the host country, they tend to drop the cultural 
traits from their home country.  However, Birman and Trickett uncovered an interesting caveat in 
that there is a generational difference in acculturation in the sphere of identity.  The second or 
1.5 generation of Jewish refugees is more likely to maintain or make claim to a “Russian” 
identity than their parents, even as they acculturate to their country of destination.  They 
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hypothesized that this generational difference is partly due to the lived experience.  For the 
younger generation, being “Russian” is more of a label than a reality.  However, further research 
is needed (Birman & Trickett, 2001).   
 Trickett and Birman (2005) later found that for the children of Soviet Jewish immigrants, 
American acculturation and the adoption of an American identity mattered for school adaptation.  
Although their results were consistent with the hypothesis mentioned above, which was that 
Soviet Jewish youth would hold on to their Russian cultural identity while adopting an American 
identity, retaining a Russian identity seemed to have no effect on school performance.  However, 
the adoption of an American identity had a positive effect.  They suggested that this result shows 
that American identity has a positive connotation for Soviet Jews and so they are able to 
assimilate as a group into the white racial majority.   
 Another study looked at identification with white culture among East European (Bosnia, 
Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Bulgaria) youth in New York City. However, this was an 
extremely small sample (n=5), pulled from a slightly larger multi-ethnic sample (n=35).  After 
interviewing these five respondents, the author noted that they all identified with hip-hop culture 
and used what the author called African American English (AAE).  They were intentional about 
“disidentifying” with white culture.  Although this is not a large enough sample to attempt any 
generalizations, it would be helpful to further explore why immigrant youths who are not faced 
with racial barriers to assimilation choose to acculturate by adapting some of the cultural traits of 
a marginalized native-born population (Cutler, 2008).   
  Kishinevsky (2004) was struck by the American relationship to food and body image.  
She interviewed three generations of women from five families.  What emerged were larger 
discourses covering individualism vs. collectivism, family structures, ideas about the self, and 
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the losses and gains affiliated with the emigration experience.  She found that there is a strong 
matriarchal connection within families and extended families among “Russian immigrants”5 that 
is strikingly similar to African American family structures.  This structure persists after 
immigration, but there are acculturation processes related to ideas about beauty and eating habits 
that challenge the matriarchal family dynamic.   
 An empirical study that is closest to my research is Kopnina’s (2005) work on FSU 
immigrants in Western Europe.  According to Liebert (2010), Kopnina’s study “…the only 
English-language empirical research of post-Soviet labor migration to the West is an 
ethnographic study of Russian-speaking migrants and immigrants in London and Amsterdam” 
(p. 7).   
 She collected data through interviews, and looked at the constructs of community, 
subcommunity, identity, culture and ethnicity.  She found that Russian-speaking communities are 
“invisible” partly because they choose to be, but also because many are white and are able to 
structurally assimilate.  Russian-speaking immigrants operate in and belong to subcommunities 
that are smaller and more particularistic than traditional communities.  The types of informal 
social networks that were the key to survival in the FSU are not kept by legal Russian-speaking 
immigrants.   
 My key critique of this study is simple, but it gets at a “mistake” I am trying to correct 
with my dissertation research.  Kopnina begins her book by identifying her population of study 
as “Russian-speakers.”  She even offers two chapters covering the complex cultural and ethnic 
identity of this population. However, as the book progresses, she loses the term “speaker” as a 
                                                           
5 She uses the term “Russian immigrants” in the title of her book, and she refers to her population throughout as 
“Russian” even though she notes the ethnic diversity of this group. Also, all the pseudonyms of her sample have 
Jewish surnames. 
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descriptor and refers to her population simply as “Russian.”  This is an example of academic 
work that generalizes all FSU immigrants, despite their country of origin and/or ethnicity, as 
Russian.   
Empirical Studies on Immigrant Tensions and Conflict 
 Another part of the assimilation process is how immigrant populations relate to each 
other, rather than just to the native-born population, system and culture.  The study of inter- and 
intragroup conflicts among immigrants is not new.  Other migration studies considered 
intragroup conflict or tension but  mostly focused on gender (Jones-Correa, 1998; Grzywaxz, 
Rao, Gentry, Marin, & Arcury, 2009) or generation, both generation by age and generation since 
immigration (Kishinevsky, 2004; Jimenez, 2008). Only the Kishinevsky study focused on 
populations from the former Soviet Union.  She looked at mother/daughter dyads (using three 
generations) to better understand a generational relationship to food and body image.  She used 
“Russian immigrants” in the title of her study.  However, she used Jewish pseudo-surnames and 
included other countries of origin-- Ukraine, Belarus, and countries of the Transcaucasus, and 
Central Asia – in her study.  She did get at the ethnic diversity of the group and indicated that she 
would only use Russian to refer to the non-Jewish population from Russia, but she repeatedly fell 
back to the totalizing language of “Russian immigrants.” From a postcolonial orientation, she 
begins with a problematic identification schema.   
 Birman and Trickett (2001) and Kasinitz et al. (2008) noted the tensions that exist 
between the former Soviet and American Jewish communities.   Jewish identity differs 
depending on one’s country of origin.  In the FSU, Jews have a separate ethnicity.  In the U.S., 
Jews have more of a religious affiliation.  These studies noted the frustrations felt by both Soviet 
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and American Jewish communities.  In Kasinitz et al. (2008), one respondent joked about the 
difference in feeling too Jewish in the Soviet Union, but not Jewish enough in the U.S.  
Research Hypotheses 
 The introduction traced the history behind contemporary migration flows to the United 
States from the FSU.  The literature review established my study’s theoretical foundation in 
social capital, push-pull and incorporation migration theories, and it reviewed the empirical 
studies on the experiences of former Soviet immigrants in the United States. These concepts are 
interwoven throughout the seven hypotheses I created.   
In the introduction, I noted that my guiding research question is:  To what extent does a 
Soviet legacy shape the experiences of immigrants from the FSU in the U.S.?  There are three 
relevant statuses for immigrants in the U.S. that can give some insight into this historical legacy 
and whether it still matters.  This research project looks at the issues of refugee status, titularity6 
and ethnicity in determining how FSU immigrants adjust and adapt to life in the U.S.   
Refugee Status/ incorporation & adjustment 
Refugee status is tied to a Soviet legacy.  Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
immigrants from the USSR were granted refugee status; after the collapse of the USSR, some 
civil wars, ethnic backlash against non-titular persons, and rising nationalism under the new era 
of independence produced a new, post-Soviet wave of refugees and asylum seekers in the U.S.  
This is important because refugees get formal institutional support from non-profit organizations 
and governmental organizations.  However, the post-Soviet era brought economic and non-
refugee immigrants to the U.S. as well.  Liebert (2010) investigated informal institutions and 
                                                           
6 The titles of former Soviet republics represent ethnic groups.  A titular immigrant is one whose ethnicity and 
country of origin match.  For example, a titular immigrant would be a Russian from Russia.  A non-titular immigrant 
would be a Russian from Uzbekistan.   
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their roles in increasing the vulnerability of immigrants, especially those from Central Asia who 
are often in the U.S. temporarily and even illegally.   
 Because immigrants from the Soviet Union had formal institutional support (e.g. 
government and Jewish community organizations) in general, the total former Soviet immigrant 
population before the collapse of the Soviet Union may have been relatively better resourced 
than those who emigrated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but this hypothesis has not been 
empirically confirmed.  Although there were refugees from the FSU after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the flows diversified and included non-refugees.  Liebert (2010) suggested there 
have been varying outcomes based on an immigrant’s access to formal vs. informal institutions.   
Because of these trends, my first hypothesis is: 
H1:  Refugees from the FSU rely on formal institutions (such as government programs, 
community organizations, and religious institutions) after immigration while non-
refugees rely on informal institutions (such as friends and family members) after 
immigration.   
Titularity/ post-colonial tension 
The Soviet legacy is especially relevant when considering titular status.  One of Josef 
Stalin’s major decisions was to grant territorial autonomy, in the form of a Soviet republic, to the 
major ethnic groups of the Soviet empire, with the exception of Jews. This history of the 
formation and eventual independence of republics creates the issue of titularity among 
immigrants from the FSU.  People whose ethnicity matches their citizenship are considered 
titular (for example, Uzbeks from Uzbekistan).  People whose ethnicity does not match their 
citizenship are considered non-titular (for example, Russians from Uzbekistan).  The mix of 
titular and non-titular citizens in post-Soviet republics is tied to Soviet and continued post-Soviet 
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migration flows, some voluntary, some forced.  Scholars of former Soviet migration flows 
(Korobkov, 2007; Sahadeo, 2007; Zayonchkovskaya, 2000) studied the trends of former Soviet 
immigrants migrating within the FSU.  They noted that late Soviet and early post-Soviet 
migration flows were related to ethnic tensions until around 1995.  Ethnic tensions were 
especially an issue with non-titular persons. However, beginning in 1996, post-Soviet flows were 
more connected to economic concerns. My hypotheses 2 and 2a are:    
H2:  Non-titular immigrants are more likely to report experiences of ethnic discrimination 
as a reason for leaving their country of origin than titular immigrants.    
H2a:  Non-titular immigrants who moved before 1996 are more likely to report ethnic 
discrimination as a reason for leaving their country of origin than titular immigrants.  
Research by Agadjanian et al. (2008) showed that Europeans in the Central Asian republic of 
Kyrgyzstan felt less connected to their country and community and reported that they would 
more likely emigrate permanently than titular persons.  Hypothesis 3 is: 
H3:  Titular immigrants are more likely to be temporary immigrants and intend to return 
home to live.  
Because temporary immigration usually does not include the migration of the entire household, it 
may be used as an additional source of income for the household in the home country.  Stark and 
Bloom (1985) refer to this strategy as “risk minimization.”  Hypothesis 4 is:  
H4:  Titular immigrants are more likely to send remittances to their country of origin, and 
they remit more frequently than non-titular immigrants. 
Ethnicity/ discrimination 
 Rising nationalism since perestroika/glasnost exacerbated tensions within former Soviet 
populations among ethnic groups.  These conflicts may have an effect on social networks and the 
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production of informal social capital.  However, because the Soviet Union was a colonial empire 
with Russia the colonizing entity, Russians were possibly more aware of newly independent state 
nationalistic rhetoric than non-Russians.  Hypothesis 5 is:  
H5:  Russians feel less connected to other immigrants from the FSU than non-Russians. 
Ethnic groups in the FSU can be divided into the following broad categories:   European non-
Jewish, Jewish, Transcaucasian, and Asian.   Asians comprise the only “non-white” group.  
Ethno-racial hierarchies can create problems of incorporation for non-white immigrants in the 
U.S (Portes & Zhou, 1993).  If immigrants feel marginalized because of these hierarchies, then 
they are more likely to take a transnational identity (Bloemraad, 2004; Levitt, 2009; Morawska, 
2004).  They are more likely to maintain a sense that their country of origin is home while living 
in their country of destination.  Hypotheses 6a and 6b are:  
H6a:  Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to report discrimination in the U.S. 
based on ethnicity; 
H6b:  Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to express a transnational identity.  
(Transnational identity = country of origin is "home.") 
Conclusion 
The preceding chapters served as a primer for my research. In the Introduction, I situated 
myself in the research and wove a narrative into the historical background of Soviet and post-
Soviet immigration flows into the U.S.  In the Literature Review, I used two theoretical 
frameworks (social capital and migration theories) to explore literature relevant to a post-Soviet 
immigration into the U.S.  Post-Soviet immigration is a process that sometimes challenges and 
other times supports existing theories related to immigration.  The literature also served as 
justification for my research hypotheses.  The preceding, then, is a platform on which to tell the 
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proceeding story of migration as explained to me by my respondents from former Soviet 
republics who live in Brooklyn, NY and Nashville, TN.    
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
 My research approach involved mixed methods of inquiry in two separate communities:  
Brooklyn (New York) and Nashville (Tennessee).   I used three methods of inquiry to generate 
and analyze data for this study: secondary data research, surveys, and semi-structured interviews.    
Those methods are further detailed below.  First, I explain the reasons why Brooklyn and 
Nashville were chosen as research sites. 
 These communities, which are also sometimes referred to in this dissertation as Kings 
County (Brooklyn) and Davidson County (Nashville), are spatially, ethnically, and historically 
different.  Brooklyn has one of the oldest established and most concentrated Russian-speaking 
communities in the U.S (Gold, 1991).  Nashville, on the other hand, is considered to be a “new 
destination” for foreign-born immigrants.  Massey and Capoferro (2008) and Donato, Tolbert, 
Nucci, and Kawano (2008) showed quantitatively how the geography of (foreign) immigration in 
the U.S. has increasingly diversified since 1990. The American South, for example, is a new 
destination for immigrants.  Empirical studies support the claim that Nashville has become a 
more prominent destination for immigrants:  Nashville’s foreign born population increased by 
more than 200 percent between 1990 and 2000 (Lotspeich, Fix, Ost, & Perez-Lopez, 2003; 
Cornfield et al., 2003).  Such growth continued between 2000 and 2010, as the city’s foreign-
born population increased from 7 percent to 12 percent of the total population.  In Kings County 
during the same time period, the foreign-born population as a percentage of the total population 
held steady at 38 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey).  The 
following vignette depicts the former Soviet contexts as they differ qualitatively between 
Brooklyn and Nashville.   
37 
 
 When you walk into a grocery store stocking products from Eurasia, you are hit by the 
smells of smoked meats, the brine of salted fish, fragrant black tea, baked bread, and depending 
on the time of day, the smell of fried meat, potato or cabbage pies (piroshky). This is the same if 
you walk into Alexei’s in Nashville, or M & I International in Brighton Beach, Brooklyn.  They 
offer other similar products, such as black currant juice, pickled everything (cucumbers, 
mushrooms, beets, peppers, squash, etc.), sparkling water from Georgia (Borjomi), frozen 
dumplings (pelmeni), instant coffee, a dizzying array of chocolates, and Russian-language 
magazines.  Meat and cheese are not prepackaged; you order them by the kilo from a deli 
counter.  The surly cashier is omnipresent, and is a throwback to Soviet era customer service.  
Jobs were secure, no matter if one was rude or friendly.  You are more likely to be greeted with a 
stern “What do you want?” rather than that all-American “How can I help you?”   Unless you 
break the public cold barrier with persons from the FSU, you will never experience the private 
warmth that is just under the surface.   
 When you step outside the grocery stores, the contexts change dramatically.  Outside of 
M & I International in Brighton Beach, you find yourself surrounded by Cyrillic and as one 
informant told me, a Soviet time-capsule from the 1980s.  The pounding of the subway rumbles 
overhead.  You experience the informality of street life on the sidewalks (Jacobs, 1993), much 
like you would in Moscow, Russia or Chisinau, Moldova.  On the other hand, the experience of 
the Soviet or post-Soviet stops immediately as you exit Alexei’s in Nashville.   You find yourself 
in a typical American suburban strip mall.  This is true with other cultural institutions in 
Nashville.  The former Soviet cultural institutions (spaces where culture is reproduced) in 
Davidson County are islands surrounded by a sea of American suburbia and only accessible by 
car.  Those in Kings County are more concentrated and allow for pedestrian interaction.  Picking 
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very different “old” and “new” immigrant destinations can highlight different immigrant 
experiences.   
Secondary Data Research 
 To establish a demographic profile of immigrants from the FSU in the U.S., I used U.S. 
Census data from 1990 and 2000.  I used this data because it allowed for a comparison of 
demographic and social variables over time (before and after the collapse of the USSR) and 
across groups (former Soviet versus total foreign born).  I compare a set of variables included in 
both the 1990 and 2000 Censuses; these variables include language spoken at home, family 
structure, sex and age, education, employment, poverty and housing. For the 2010 Census, the 
U.S. Census Bureau stopped collecting information on all of the variables included in the 2000 
and 1990 Censuses.  The Census Bureau used the American Community Survey (ACS) as the 
primary source for much of the demographic and social variables previously captured by the 
Census.  The data for the variables listed above by place of birth are not available for years past 
2000.   
 The ACS is useful for determining estimates on country of birth for the foreign born 
population at different levels of geography, such as at the census tract level or the county level.  
Using 2010 ACS data and geographic information system (GIS) technology, I created maps to 
show the spatial concentration of FSU immigrants in my two research sites and in U.S. states.  
The U.S. Census split the FSU into two separate regional categories:  Europe and Asia.  Within 
these categories, only some of the countries are represented individually (Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan).  Other former Soviet 
countries are absorbed into “other” regions (Eastern Europe, South Central Asia, and Western 
Asia).   
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Primary Data Research 
 To develop the survey and interview guide, I used my research hypotheses to justify the 
majority of the questions I asked.  Table 4 summarizes my research matrix. It lists the measures 
(i.e. specific interview and survey questions) I used to explore my hypotheses.  A short survey 
was created (Appendix B) and then translated from English into Russian.  The survey was edited 
by a native Russian speaker and given to a different native Russian speaker to back translate it 
into English.  I compared the two English surveys for discrepancies and resolved the 
discrepancies that were evident. I piloted both language versions of the survey before finalizing 
them.  Surveys were given to potential respondents in person.  If the respondent consented, then 
he or she filled out the survey on the spot.  Refusal rate was low.  Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted during survey collection in order to supplement the quantitative data of the study 
and further explore the research hypotheses.  Interviews were conducted in the respondents’ 
location of choice, often in their homes or places of business.   
Table 4:  Research Matrix 
Individual 
Status 
Hypothesis Specific measures/ questions 
Refugee 
H1: Refugees from the 
FSU rely on formal 
institutions (such as 
government programs, 
community 
organizations, and 
religious institutions) 
after immigration 
while non-refugees 
rely on informal 
institutions (such as 
friends and family 
members) after 
immigration.   
 
Interview question: 30: Who do you rely on for help?  Survey questions:  
9. When you entered the U.S., did you have refugee status or later get 
asylum status? (yes/no)  23. When you immigrated to the U.S., which of 
the following did you rely on for financial or other types of help (check all 
that apply:  US Govt, State Govt, Local Govt, Chuch/Synagogue/ Mosque, 
Community/Non-profit org, Family, Friends, Other): 
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Titularity 
H2:  Non-titular 
immigrants are more 
likely to report 
experiences of ethnic 
discrimination as a 
reason for leaving 
their country of origin 
than titular 
immigrants.    
H2a:  Non-titular 
immigrants who 
moved before 1996 are 
more likely to report 
ethnic discrimination 
as a reason for leaving 
their country of origin 
than titular 
immigrants.  
 
Interview Questions: 3. Country of Origin, 4. Year of entry, 6. 
Ethnicity/Nationality, 15. Why did you leave (country of origin)?, 35. Did 
you ever feel discriminated against in (your country of origin)? How and 
why did you think it happened?; Survey Questions: 3. Country you lived 
in before moving to the United States (Country of Origin) (open ended), 5.  
Ethnicity (open ended) 18. I left my country because (please check all that 
apply:  a. I wanted to experience life somewhere else., b. I was 
persecuted/negatively treated because of my:  Ethnicity (check box), 
Religion (check box), Political Beliefs (check box), I did not feel 
persecuted/negatively treated (check box); c. My country is corrupt and I 
wanted to leave; d. I did not have an economic future in my country; e. My 
family moved away; f. My friends moved away; g. Other: (open ended) 
H3:  Titular 
immigrants will more 
likely be temporary 
immigrants and intend 
to return home to live  
Interview Questions: 3. Country of Origin,  6. Ethnicity/Nationality, 16.  
Do you intend to return home to (country of origin) to live or do you 
intend to stay in the U.S.? ; Survey Questions: 3. Country you lived in 
before moving to the United States (Country of Origin) (open ended), 5.  
Ethnicity (open ended); 24.I intend to return to live in my country of 
origin someday. (yes/no) 
H4:  Titular 
immigrants will more 
likely and more 
frequently send 
remittances to their 
country of origin than 
non-titular 
immigrants. 
Interview Questions: 3. Country of Origin,  6. Ethnicity 21. Do you 
support anyone in (country of origin) with money earned here?; Survey 
Questions: 3. Country you lived in before moving to the United States 
(Country of Origin) (open ended), 5.  Ethnicity (open ended); 26.  I send 
money back home to my family and/or friends in my country of origin 
(approximately: Once a month, A few times a year, Once a year, Once 
every few years, Never) 
H5:  Russians will feel 
less connected to other 
immigrants from the 
FSU than will non-
Russians 
Interview Questions: 6. Ethnicity/Nationality 32. How do you feel about 
other immigrants from the former Soviet Union?; Survey Questions: 5. 
Ethnicity (open ended), 20. How strongly do you feel connected to other 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the U.S? (Very strongly, 
Strongly, Somewhat, Not at all) 
Ethnicity 
H6a:  Non-European 
ethnic groups are more 
likely to report 
experiences of 
discrimination in the 
U.S. based on 
ethnicity. 
Interview Questions: 6. Ethnicity/Nationality, 17. When you think of 
home, where is it for you?, 26. How do you think you are perceived by 
Americans?, 34. Do you ever feel discriminated against here?  How and 
why do you think it happens?; Survey Questions: 5.  Ethnicity (open 
ended), 16. The country I consider to be my home is (open ended), 21. Do 
you feel discriminated against in the U.S. because of your ethnicity? (All 
the time, Sometimes, Rarely, Never)    
H6b:  Non-European 
ethnic groups are more 
likely to express a 
transnational identity.  
(Transnational identity 
= country of origin is 
"home.") 
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Sampling 
 To determine my sampling universes, I first looked at the 2009 ACS data on country of 
birth for the foreign born population in Kings and Davidson Counties.  Of the 15 former Soviet 
republics, only 9 (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan) are identified individually.  The other six (Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) are combined with other countries under an “other” 
category in their respective regions.   The 2011 ACS indicated that there were 111,348 
immigrants from the FSU in Kings County and 1,173 in Davidson County.  
 Because my initial hypotheses could be tested using t-tests and chi-squared analyses, I 
used the statistical power calculator Gpower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to 
calculate a-priori sample sizes to guide my sampling.  To detect a medium effect (d = .30) at a 
power level (1 – β) of 0.80, I would need a sample size of 134 surveys for t-tests.  To detect the 
same effect size (w = .30) at the same power for chi-square analyses, I would require between 
145 (df = 1) and 207 (df = 4) respondents.    My goal was to collect 100 surveys at each research 
site (total n = 200). I aimed for 100 surveys at each site based on the sample size needed to 
achieve decent power to test my hypotheses, but my survey goal was also based on what I 
thought was possible given my existing connections in FSU communities and the strategies I had 
for making future connections.  For interviewing, I wanted to have a sample that represented a 
demographic variety of respondents from the region.  My interview goal was to collect 16 
interviews at each research site (n = 32).  The reason my target was 16 was based on what I 
thought was feasible and my attempt to get variability in all categories relevant to my 
hypotheses:  refugee status, titularity and ethnicity.  There were four ethnic categories, so my 
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goal was to get four interviews to represent each ethnic group.  The pre-determined goal was not 
realized, but the essential goal of variability in all three hypothesis categories was realized.  
 Because I wanted variability in my sample, I tried to implement quota sampling (Babbie, 
2005) to guide the survey and interview efforts. Based on the organizing categories for my 
hypotheses, I created sampling categories based on refugee status, titularity and ethnicity.  I 
collapsed countries of origin into regions of origin:  Eastern Europe and the Baltics, 
Transcaucasus, and Central Asia. The collapsed ethnic categories were:  European non-Jewish 
(Belarussian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian), Jewish, 
Transcaucasian (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and Asian (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, 
Turkmen, and Uzbek). Finally, I included titularity as a sampling category.  A titular immigrant 
is one whose ethnicity and country of origin match (e.g. Ukrainian from Ukraine).  During the 
early Soviet period, all major ethnic groups except Jews had or were granted a republic.  Jews 
comprised the only major ethnic group in the Soviet Union that lived, mostly, in a contiguous 
territory but was not granted republic status.  Because Jews were not granted a republic, all 
Jewish respondents in this study are considered “non-titular.” To further promote variability, I 
included age and gender in my quota sampling scheme.  The age categories were:  18 or older 
when the USSR collapsed (born 1973 or before), and younger than 18 when the USSR collapsed 
but currently 18 years of age or older (born 1974-1992).  As I was sampling, I monitored 
responses rates according to my sampling matrix.  If I found that one subgroup was lacking, I 
tried to target members of that group.  Table 5 provides my sampling matrix and some 
descriptive categorical results.      
 There were multiple points of entry for snowball sampling in both data collection sites for 
interview and survey collections. I used multiple points of entry to ensure that more than one 
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stream of FSU immigrants was represented in each site.  Points of entry and data collection were 
guided by my quota sampling scheme outlined above to promote diversity in sampling.  In 
Nashville, I used personal connections and cultural institutions as points of entry.  These 
included friends, an email listserv that connects local immigrants from former Soviet republics, a 
grocery store selling imported Russian, East European and Eurasian goods, and a pizza parlor 
where I happened to overhear employees speaking Russian.  The employees in the pizza parlor 
were from Central Asia.   
 In Brooklyn, I had one personal connection which led to only one interview.  The 
majority of my respondents were found with the help of scholars doing research among the 
Russian-speaking Jewish population in Brooklyn, cultural institutions (grocery stores and 
restaurants) and on-the-spot street discussions in Brighton Beach and Sheepshead Bay, which are 
two areas of Brooklyn where a concentration of FSU immigrants live.  The on-the-spot street 
discussions were possible because I was with two young teenagers who were friends with my 
home stay family.  They helped me approach people on the street.  My host mother worked 
several jobs, one of which was in a hair salon.  She was enthusiastic about my research and 
introduced me to some of her clients, many of whom included former Soviet immigrants. I was 
able to get a couple of surveys and one interview out of her connections at the hair salon.  She 
also introduced me to the owner of one of her favorite Central Asian restaurants.  He agreed to 
an interview and completed the survey.  This is one example of how one gatekeeper helped me 
meet research participants.   
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Table 5:  Sampling Matrix 
Sampling 
Category 
Description Interviews  Surveys 
Brooklyn Nashville  Brooklyn Nashville 
Region of 
Origin (not 
birth) 
Eastern Europe & Balticsa  6 5  80 31 
Transcaucasusb   6 2  20 6 
Central Asiac  4 3  29 7 
       
Ethnicity European non-Jewish 4 5  65 32 
Jewish 3 2  32 4 
Transcaucasian 5 2  21 5 
Asian 4 2  13 5 
       
Titularity Titulard 9 6  73 37 
Non-Titulare 7 4  58 9 
       
Refugee 
Status 
Refugee/ Asylum 10 3  71 11 
Non-Refugee/ Non-Asylum 6 7  57 35 
       
Age Soviet Adultf: born 1973 or 
earlier 
10 5 
 
77 26 
Post-Soviet Adultg: born 1974 
or later 
6 5 
 
48 20 
       
Gender Male 5 5  56 21 
Female 11 5  75 25 
Total  16 10  131 46 
a includes Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine 
b includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 
c includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 
d ethnicity and nationality match – for example, a Georgian from Georgia 
e ethnicity and nationality do not match – for example a Russian from Moldova 
f turned 18 before the collapse of the USSR 
g turned 18 after the collapse of the USSR 
 I did not share my personal opinions, assumptions or hypotheses with the persons I 
interviewed.  However, at the end of some of the interviews, if a respondent asked questions or 
seemed interested, I did share my thoughts. Potential interview and survey respondents were 
generally interested in my research project.  The refusal rate was low.     
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 I compared my sample survey results to secondary data statistics in order to determine the 
level of representativeness of my sample. I used the 2011 ACS one year estimate for the U.S. and 
the five year estimate for the counties (Table 6).  I chose two different ACS estimates because 
the one year estimate is more accurate for areas with large populations and the five year 
estimates are more appropriate for smaller areas with smaller populations.  The least frequent 
populations from my study sample were persons born in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.   
However, compared to the Census data, these populations were actually overrepresented.   
Table 6:  Study sample comparisons to ACS samples (Source: 2011 American Community Survey). 
Proportions 
(Region of 
Birth) 
Brooklyn 
Survey Sample 
(N=131) 
Nashville 
Survey 
Sample 
(N=46) 
U.S. 2011 
ACS Sample 
(1 year 
estimate; 
Former 
Soviet 
population 
N=1,049,495) 
Kings 
County 2011 
ACS Sample 
(5 year 
estimate; 
Former 
Soviet 
population 
N=111,348) 
Davidson 
County 2011 
ACS Sample 
(5 year 
estimate; 
Former 
Soviet 
population 
N=1173) 
Eastern Europe 
& Balticsa  62% 72% 85% 92% 84% 
Transcaucasusb   18% 13% 8% 1% 3% 
Central Asiac  21% 15% 7% 8% 14% 
aSurvey Countries are:  Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine; ACS Countries are:  Belarus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine 
bSurvey Countries are:  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia; ACS Countries are:  Armenia 
cSurvey Countries are:  Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; ACS Countries are:  Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan 
Primary Data Analysis 
 I fell short of my goals in Nashville for interviews (n = 10) and survey (n = 46) 
collection.  In retrospect, it was perhaps too ambitious to hope to sample 10 percent of the FSU 
immigrant population in Nashville.  But, the perception among FSU immigrants whom I 
interviewed in Nashville is that the ACS drastically underestimates the total number of FSU 
immigrants in the area.  Also, as noted above, many FSU countries are left out of the total FSU 
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estimates because they are not individually identified by the Census in publicly available data.  
In Brooklyn, however, I was able to meet my interview goal (n = 16) and exceed my survey goal 
(n = 131).   
 With a Brooklyn survey sample size of 131, using a chi square analysis, I am able to 
detect an effect size (w) of 0.31 (α = 0.05, 1 – β = 0.95, df = 1, λ = 18.57, Critical X2 = 9.49) to 
0.38 (α = 0.05, 1 – β = 0.95, df = 4, λ = 12.99, Critical X2 = 3.84).  With that same sample size, 
using a two-tailed t-test, I am able to detect an effect size (d) of 0.30 (α = 0.05, 1 – β = 0.95, σ = 
3.63, Critical t = 1.98).  With a Nashville survey sample size of 46, using a chi squared analysis, 
I am able to detect an effect size (w) of 0.53 (α = 0.05, 1 – β = 0.95, df = 1, λ = 12.99, Critical X2 
= 3.84) to 0.63 (α = 0.05, 1 – β = 0.95, df = 4, λ = 18.57, Critical X2 = 9.49).  With that same 
sample size, using a two-tailed t-test, I am able to detect an effect size (d) of 0.48 (α = 0.05, 1 – β 
= 0.95, σ = 3.69, Critical t = 2.02).   
 Because I fell short of my Nashville sampling goal, I tested whether I could combine the 
Brooklyn and Nashville data.  I used “county” as the grouping variable and ran t-tests and chi 
square tests on the following variables:  education, titularity, refugee status, and religion.  They 
were all statistically significantly different, so I could not combine the datasets in order to test 
my hypotheses. Chi square tests were conducted on all hypotheses except H5.  T-tests were 
conducted on H4 and H5.  I also conducted correlation analyses to explore social capital 
variables in the Brooklyn dataset.   
Once interviews were completed, I transcribed the English or English translation.  I used 
Strauss’s (1987, cited in Berg, 2009) open coding strategy in an Atlas.ti program.  The purpose 
of open coding is to take a step back from the data by looking at it very closely using a line-by-
line coding process.   I constructed my interview questions using my hypotheses.  Therefore, I 
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did not have to keep each hypothesis in mind while I coded initially.  After conducting a line-by-
line coding, I sorted the data using a coding frame (David & Sutton, 2004, cited in Berg, 2009) 
into the following five categories:  titularity, ethnicity, refugee status, push/pull; incorporation.  
Once the data were sorted into these categories, I analyzed those data looking for the plausibility 
of my hypotheses and supplemental information for my survey data.   
Conclusion 
 Even though I attempted to follow a quota sampling scheme, my samples essentially are 
convenience samples.  All the studies on FS populations included in my review of the empirical 
literature with the exception of Kasinitz et al. (2008) and Miller et al. (2006) relied on 
convenience or snowball sampling. Vinukorov, Birman, and Trickett (2000) noted that studies of 
this population (FS immigrants) in the U.S. indicate that these immigrants will not return 
questionnaires to people they do not know or have not met.  My experience confirmed this 
difficulty in collecting data.  Therefore, it was key to establish contact with “gatekeepers” in 
Brooklyn and Nashville.  Snowball sampling has been the norm in studies of FSU populations 
even if a purposive or directed sampling strategy was used.  Purposive or directed sampling is a 
non-probability sampling scheme that is guided by a set of criteria, such as variability in refugee 
status, ethnicity and titularity, rather than just who is conveniently available.  
 My research offers multiple ways of addressing a large gap in research on immigrants 
from former Soviet republics living in the United States.  My contribution to research was my 
ability to access this community at multiple points of entry in qualitatively different research 
sites.  I gathered surveys and interviews in a well-established FSU immigrant destination as well 
as in a relatively new immigrant destination.  The next chapter describes my findings from 
secondary, survey and interview research.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter gives an orientation to the Soviet and former Soviet (FSU) population in the 
United States through the analysis of secondary data and then explores whether my hypotheses 
are supported in the survey and interview data. The guiding research question for this study is:  
To what extent does a Soviet legacy shape the experiences of immigrants from the FSU in the 
U.S.?  Refugee status, titularity and ethnicity represent various categories of immigrant 
experiences, and these themes were used to explore the guiding research question and shape my 
hypotheses.     
Secondary Data 
The Census and other government data show why this population is relevant for scholars 
and non-scholars.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the FSU foreign-born population has 
grown steadily in the U.S., although that growth tapered off by the year 2000.  In this section, I 
overview the profiled the secondary data create about FS immigrants.  This profile includes 
population size, demographic/social characteristics, and the spatial concentration of this 
population in the U.S. and in my two research sites.   
 Figure 1 depicts how the total population of former Soviet immigrants in the U.S. has 
changed since 1960.  Mortality and a lack of replenishment might explain the decrease of this 
group from 1960 to 1990, but there is no evidence to support this.  Furthermore, in a personal 
communication with Andrei Korobkov (August 7, 2013), he commented that mortality and a lack 
of immigrants cannot explain the sharp decrease between 1960 and 1990.  Rather, he assumes 
that immigrants during the Cold War period were not identifying themselves as Soviet-born.  
Also, Korobkov noted a discrepancy in the population of FSU and Soviet immigrants in the U.S. 
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reported in the U.S. Census and in Russian reports.  He noted that the U.S. reports likely 
underrepresented the actual numbers.   
 Figures 2 and 3 present data from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office 
of Immigration Statistics (FY 2012).  These data are intended to contextualize the Census data in 
Figure 1 and provide a better idea about the flow of immigrants or potential immigrants into the 
U.S. from former Soviet republics.  Figure 2 shows that around ten thousand people or more 
from former Soviet republics every year are getting visas to enter the U.S.  This includes all visa 
categories.  Figure 3 also shows that there are substantial numbers of persons from former Soviet 
republics obtaining permanent legal status in the U.S. every year.  However, Figure 3 is a little 
misleading as DHS lists “Russia” as the country of last residence, but footnotes for the figure 
indicate that for 1990 to 1999 “Russia” meant all former Soviet republics.  By 2000, Russia 
actually meant Russia, and other former Soviet republics were not individually identified in the 
data.   
 
Figure 1:  Immigrant fluctuation from former Soviet republics.  (Source:  US Census Data) 
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     Figure 2:  U.S. Visa Distribution to FS populations7. (Source: Department of Homeland Security        
     Office of Immigration Statistics, FY2012) 
 
                 
                                                           
7 FSU populations include persons from all FSU republics except Azerbaijan and Belarus, which are not listed as 
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Figure 3:  Legal Permanent Residency for FS Immigrants8 (Source: Department of Homeland Security        
Office of Immigration Statistics, FY2012) 
 
It is useful to compare the demographic characteristics of FSU immigrants in the 1990 
and 2000 Censuses and to compare them to the rest of the foreign-born population in the U.S.  
Unfortunately, the U.S. Census did not provide a similar table for 2010 so this comparison is 
possible only for the decade before and after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Temporal and 
immigrant “group” comparisons suggest how FS immigrants have fared in U.S. society over time 
and as an immigrant group.  Table 7 presents comparisons of 29 demographic and social 
variables.  The most interesting comparisons (temporal and immigrant group) are for language 
                                                           
8 From 1920-1900, these numbers represent persons from the Soviet Union.  From 1991-1999, these numbers 
represent persons from Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  From 2000 on, these numbers represent persons from Russia 
only.  Data on persons from other FS republics are not reported.   
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ability, education level, household composition, age, employment skill set, and housing 
ownership.   
FS immigrants have not dropped their native language as the preferred language to speak 
at home.  The data suggest that since the collapse of the USSR, the FS population has been 
preserving their language at home much more than the U.S. foreign-born population as a whole.   
A larger percentage of FS immigrants live in married households than does the foreign-born 
population as whole.  During the Soviet period the FS population was an “aging population.”  
Twenty-eight percent of the Soviet-born population in the U.S. was 75 or older as compared to 
only seven percent of the total foreign-born population.   In 2000, the percentage of the former 
Soviet-born population age 75 or older dropped to 10 percent, but it was still higher than the 
percentage of the foreign-born population age 75 or older (5 percent).  The housing ownership 
data also show that in 2000 a larger percentage of the FS immigrant population rented (64 
percent) than the overall immigrant population (50 percent).    
53 
 
Table 7: Demographic Characteristics of FS and all foreign born populations in US before and after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 & 2000).:   
Variable 
Former Soviet Population  Foreign Born Population 
1990 2000  1990 2000 
Language Spoken at Home          
  Speak language other than English 81% 93%  79% 83% 
  English less than "very well" 64% 63%  59% 61% 
Relationship          
  Individuals in households 97% 99%  98% 99% 
  Individuals in group quarters 3% 1%  2% 1% 
  Total Family households 63% 71%  76% 78% 
  Total Married couple family household 86% 83%  78% 76% 
Sex and Age          
  Total Female 55% 54%  51% 50% 
  Total Male 45% 46%  49% 50% 
  Under 20 14% 20%  13% 13% 
  20-44 27% 39%  51% 53% 
  45-74 32% 32%  29% 30% 
  75 and over 28% 10%  7% 5% 
Education          
  Total population over 3 enrolled in school 19% 27%  21% 19% 
  School Enrollment - in higher education 44% 38%  47% 42% 
  Educational Attainment: High School Graduate 21% 19%  20% 19% 
  Educational Attainment: Bachelor's Degree 13% 23%  12% 14% 
  Educational Attainment: Graduate Degree 14% 23%  9% 10% 
Employment          
  Unemployed  13% 7%  8% 7% 
  Occupation (Managerial/Professional) 31% 44%  22% 28% 
  Industry (manufacturing) 19% 13%  21% 17% 
  Industry (health, education and social services) 16% 22%  14% 16% 
  Industry (finance, insurance and real estate) 9% 9%  6% 6% 
  Industry (retail) 15% 11%  18% 10% 
Poverty          
  Poverty status in previous year (individuals) 25% 20%  18% 18% 
  Poverty status in previous year (families) 19% 16%  15% 15% 
Housing          
  Occupied unit - rental 54% 64%  50% 50% 
  Lacking complete plumbing facilities 0.62% 1.36%  1.15% 1.25% 
  Lacking complete kitchen facilities 0.92% 1.35%  1.19% 1.18% 
  With a mortgage (owner occupied) 45% 75%  71% 77% 
 
A significantly larger percentage of FS émigrés (1990 = 31 percent; 2000 = 44 percent) 
than the broader immigrant population (1990 = 22 percent; 2000= 28 percent) was employed in 
managerial/professional occupations.  However, a larger percentage of the FS immigrant 
individuals than the broader immigrant population in 1990 (FS = 25 percent; FB = 18 percent) 
and 2000 (FS = 20 percent; FB = 18 percent) experienced poverty in the year prior to the Census.  
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The gap was much bigger in 1990.  This may be because over a quarter of the FS immigrant 
population in the US were 75 years or older in 1990.  Additional secondary data show the former 
Soviet population’s struggle with poverty.  The 2002 Jewish Community Study (Ukeles & 
Miller, 2004) discovered that  
Jewish poverty has increased significantly in New York City since 1991 — during a 
period when overall poverty rates in the city declined. From 1991 to 2002, the number of 
people estimated to be living in Jewish households under the 150% poverty level in New 
York City increased from 167,500 to 226,000 — an increase of 35% (p. 202). 
This is relevant to this study because Russian-speaking Jewish households made up a significant 
proportion (45 percent) of those in the Jewish community experiencing poverty.  The study 
reveals that in the Jewish community, Russian-speaking households with seniors age 65 or older 
form the poorest group. 
Using geographic information systems (GIS) mapping, I produced maps showing where 
FS immigrants live in the US (Figure 4) and in my two research sites (Figures 5 and 7).  The 
2010 American Community Survey provides population numbers for the following FS republics: 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
Not all fifteen FS republics are identified specifically as countries of birth.     
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Figure 4:  FS Immigrants across the U.S. (Source: 2010 American Community Survey) 
 
In Nashville, FS immigrants are spatially dispersed and do not live near other immigrant 
populations (Figure 6).  They also tend to live in middle-class parts of the city (such as Bellevue 
and Green Hills).  Conversely, in Brooklyn, FS immigrants live in concentration and among 
other immigrant populations (Figure 8), such as Chinese and Puerto Rican immigrants, and they 
live in working class neighborhoods.   
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Figure 5:  FS Population in Davidson County (Source: 2010 ACS) 
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Figure 6:  Foreign-born population in Davidson County (Source: 2010 ACS) 
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Figure 7: FS Population in Kings County (Source: 2010 ACS) 
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Figure 8:  Foreign born population in Kings County (Source: 2010 ACS) 
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Survey and Interview Findings 
I compared the interview data I collected for Nashville and Brooklyn on two economic 
characteristics (yearly income; yearly income as a proportion of area median income (AMI)) and 
ten demographic/social characteristics (age; year immigrated; gender; region of origin; ethnicity; 
titularity; refugee status; education; religion; immigration status). I performed difference in mean 
and proportion tests to compare the characteristics of the two samples (Tables 8a and 8b).  
Because I ultimately relied on snowball sampling, these differences may reflect the differences in 
sampling bias.  But, as I noted in the methods section, I also used a quota sampling scheme that 
encouraged me to make multiple points of entry into these communities as opposed to just 
following one entry trajectory.   
There are several statistically significant differences among the demographic variables of 
the Brooklyn and Nashville samples:  year immigrated, titularity and refugee statuses, 
educational attainment, and religious affiliation.  The mean difference in year immigrated is not 
surprising as Brooklyn (M = 1999) is a more popular destination for FS immigrants than is 
Nashville (M = 1996) and the continued and more recent influx is to be expected.  Also not 
surprising was the larger refugee/asylee percentage of the Brooklyn sample (56 percent) over 
Nashville (24 percent).  This is likely tied to a much larger institutional resource pool in New 
York.  An interesting finding from this set of variables was titularity.  The Nashville sample had 
a much higher proportion of titular immigrants (80 percent) than the Brooklyn sample (56 
percent).  This finding is worth noting because several of my hypotheses (H2-H4) deal with 
titularity and reasons for emigrating, intentions to return to country of origin to live, and 
remittances.  Another interesting finding is the significant difference in income when adjusted as 
a proportion of AMI (Area Median Income).  The mean income for Brooklyn is 61% of the AMI 
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and the mean income for Nashville is 87% of the AMI, which means the Nashville group is 
relatively financially better off than the Brooklyn group.     
Table 8a:  Demographic and Social Variable Comparisons (t-tests):  Brooklyn and Nashville Datasets  
  Brooklyn Sample Nashville Sample t-test 
Year of Birth      
N 125 44 
ns M 1967 1969 
SD 16.132 9.476 
Year Immigrated       
n 131 45 
2.19ⱡ M 1999 1996 
SD 7.161 7.106 
Yearly Income      
n 76 20 
ns M $41,676  $55,525  
SD $27,654  $32,165  
Yearly Income as Proportion of AMI     
n 76 20 
-2.46 ⱡ M 0.61 0.87 
SD 0.40 0.45 
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Table 8b:  Demographic and Social Variable Comparisons (chi square tests):  Brooklyn and Nashville Datasets 
 Brooklyn Sample Nashville Sample   
 n % n  % X2 
Female 75 57 25 54 ns 
Region of Origin      
Eastern Europe & Baltics 80 61 33 72 
ns 
Transcaucasus 20 15 6 13 
Central Asia 29 22 7 15 
Other* 2 2 0 0 
Ethnicity      
European Non-Jewish 65 50 32 70 
ns 
Jewish 32 24 4 9 
Transcaucasian 21 16 5 11 
Asian 13 10 5 11 
Titular Immigrant 73 56 37 80 8.84
ⱡⱡ 
Refugee/Asylee 71 56 11 24 13.52
ⱡⱡ 
Education      
Less than Secondary 2 2 1 2 
28.09ⱡⱡ 
Graduated from Secondary School 
12 9 1 2 
Attended Technical College 5 4 2 4 
Graduated from Technical College 19 15 1 2 
Attended University 20 15 6 13 
Graduated from University 63 48 20 44 
Attended Graduate School 2 2 2 4 
Graduated from Graduate School 5 4 13 28 
Religion      
Christianity (Orthodox) 62 49 21 46 
12.66ⱡ 
Christian (other) 12 10 5 11 
Jewish 32 24 3 7 
Muslim 8 6 5 11 
Atheist/Not Religious 10 8 10 22 
Other 2 2 1 2 
Immigration Status      
U.S. Citizen 69 53 30 65 
ns Permanent Resident 47 36 11 24 
Other 12 9 5 11 
* England and France      
ⱡp<.05; ⱡⱡp<.01      
 
The set of social capital variables showed only one statistically significant difference 
between the two samples (Tables 9a and 9b).  The scarcity of statistically significant differences 
in this set is an interesting finding in and of itself.  Feelings of connectedness to countries and 
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neighborhoods of origin, the U.S. and U.S. neighborhoods, immigrants and other Americans 
were similar in strength between the samples.   Immigrants from the FSU are less likely to 
engage in formal social capital production and rely more heavily on informal social capital 
production and engagement.  A low percentage of respondents from both samples were active 
with or in formal institutions.  Respondents from both samples were also much more likely to 
turn to informal institutions (friends and family) for help than formal institutions (religious, 
government, non-government organizations) when they initially immigrated.  There was one 
exception.  No respondent from the Brooklyn sample reported that he or she received help from a 
church, synagogue or mosque upon immigrating to the U.S.  However, a small percentage of 
Nashville respondents (N=4) reported that they had received help from such institutions.   
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Table 9a:  Social Capital Variables (t-tests) 
  Brooklyn Sample Nashville Sample t-test 
How Strongly Do You Feel Connected 
To*: 
     
Country of Origin      
n 121 46 
ns M 2.39 2.61 
SD 1.07 0.88 
Local Neighborhood in Country of Origin 
     
n 109 45 
ns M 2.24 1.98 
SD 0.96 0.97 
The United States      
n 108 44 
ns M 3.19 3.18 
SD 0.76 0.82 
Local Neighborhood in the U.S.      
n 105 43 
ns M 2.70 2.51 
SD 0.92 1.01 
Other Immigrants from the Former Soviet 
Union in the U.S. 
     
n 113 42 
ns M 2.48 2.6 
SD 0.81 0.77 
Other Immigrants from Other Countries 
in the U.S. 
     
n 107 42 
ns M 2.12 2.19 
SD 0.92 0.67 
Americans     
n 108 42 
ns M 2.65 2.64 
SD 0.92 0.76 
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Table 9b:  Social Capital Variables (chi square tests) 
  Brooklyn Sample Nashville Sample   
 n % n  % X2 
Active in**:      
Church/ Synagogue/ Mosque 25 19 6 13 ns 
Political Club/Group 0 0 0 0 ns 
Community Organization 2 2 3 7 ns 
School/ University 11 8 8 17 ns 
Recreational Club 9 7 3 7 ns 
Other 11 8 3 7 ns 
Help from:      
U.S Government 24 18 6 13 ns 
State Government 7 5 1 2 ns 
Local Government 4 3 1 2 ns 
Church/ Synagogue/ Mosque 0 0 4 9 11.57ⱡⱡ 
Community/ Non-profit Organization 7 5 5 11 ns 
Family  58 45 19 41 ns 
Friends 22 17 8 17 ns 
Other*** 23 17 12 26 ns 
*1=Not at all; 2=Somewhat; 3=Strongly, 4=Very strongly     
**Could select multiple responses      
***Virtually all respondents wrote in some variation of "myself"  
ⱡp<.05; ⱡⱡp<.01      
Push/pull and incorporation variables produced the most exciting set of findings on 
differences between the Nashville and Brooklyn samples (Table 10).  The two most significant 
findings from this set are also the most interesting from the comparison of samples.  These 
variables include both sides of the immigration coin: reasons for migration and experiences in 
the country of destination.   Respondents were able to choose multiple reasons for emigration 
and immigration.  One option was “I moved to the U.S. because I wanted better educational 
opportunities for me (or my children).”  A much larger proportion of respondents from Brooklyn 
choose this as one of the reasons for immigration than did respondents from Nashville.  This is 
notable because the Nashville sample had a higher level of formal education overall than did the 
Brooklyn sample.  This suggests several possibilities.  It suggests that those with lower levels of 
formal education still value educational opportunities for themselves or their families.  It also 
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suggests that for whatever reason, they felt they were not able to access or feared their children 
would not be able to access good educational opportunities in their country of origin.  Another 
possibility is that FS immigrants in Nashville on average have a higher level of education than 
those in Brooklyn so education might be a less important reason for coming.  However, the 
statement in the survey also included educational opportunities for children as a reason indicated 
in the question about educational opportunities, so it is not clear what reasoning drove the 
difference in responses.    
The other notable finding from this set of variables was the differences in experiences of 
discrimination in the U.S. based on ethnicity.  A larger proportion of respondents from Nashville 
than from Brooklyn reported experiences of discrimination based on ethnicity in the U.S.  Two 
possibilities for this are that Nashville is less multicultural and multiethnic than New York, and 
discrimination based on “indicators of difference” is likely more rampant and more overt.  Also, 
the GIS maps above show that FS immigrants in Nashville do not tend to live in areas of the city 
where other immigrants live (such as the Nolensville Pike area).  So their “difference” as 
immigrants may be more noticeable and felt more bluntly.   
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Table 10:  Push/Pull and Incorporation Variables 
  
Brooklyn 
Sample 
Nashville 
Sample   
 n % n  % X2 
The U.S. is My Home 93 78 28 62 4.28
ⱡ 
I Left My Country Because*:      
I wanted to experience life somewhere else 
61 47 29 63 ns 
I was persecuted/ negatively treated because of my: 
     
Ethnicity 23 18 6 13 ns 
Religion 12 9 5 11 ns 
Political Beliefs 2 2 4 9 ns 
My country is corrupt and I wanted to leave 35 27 11 24 ns 
I did not have an economic future in my country 
65 50 17 37 ns 
My family moved away 51 39 16 35 ns 
My friends moved away 14 11 6 13 ns 
I Moved to the U.S. Because*:      
I could make more money here than in my country of 
origin 
65 50 27 59 ns 
I wanted better educational opportunities for me (or my 
children) 
85 65 18 39 9.65ⱡⱡ 
I had/have family members here 50 38 15 33 ns 
I had/have friends here 21 16 5 11 ns 
I came here as a visitor and eventually became an 
immigrant 
19 15 14 30 5.58ⱡ 
I did not want to move to the U.S. but I had no choice 7 5 8 17 6.28ⱡ 
In the U.S. I Feel Discriminated Against Because of My 
Ethnicity: 
     
All the time 2 2 0 0 
24.79ⱡⱡ 
Sometimes 13 10 18 39 
Rarely 23 19 12 26 
Never 90 70 16 35 
I Intend to Return to My Country of Origin to Live 
Someday 
27 22 12 26 ns 
I Send Money Back to My Family and/or Friends in My 
Country of Origin: 
     
Once a month 17 13 3 7 
ns 
A few times a year 34 27 16 36 
Once a year 11 9 5 11 
Once every few years 14 11 7 16 
Never 52 41 14 31 
*Could select multiple responses  
ⱡp<.05; ⱡⱡp<.01      
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Correlations 
  Correlations were run on the Brooklyn sample only for variables related to 
connectedness, education, and remittances.  Appendix D includes all correlations.  Several 
bivariate relationships were statistically significant.  The three questions that correlated with 
three or more other questions were: 1) How strongly do you feel connected to your local 
neighborhood in the U.S? 2) How strongly do you feel connected to Americans? 3) How many 
times do you send money back to family/friends in your country of origin?   
 Connectedness.  There was a positive correlation between connectedness to local U.S. 
neighborhood and connectedness to the U.S. (r = .495, n = 102, p = .000), other immigrants from 
the FSU (r = .209, n = 105, p = .032), immigrants from other countries (r = .275, n = 102, p = 
.005), and Americans (r = .384, n = 104, p = .000).  Connectedness to local U.S. neighborhood 
negatively correlated with feelings of discrimination in the U.S. based on ethnicity (r = -.274, n = 
103, p = .005).  There was a positive correlation between connectedness to Americans and 
connectedness to the U.S. (r = .491, n = 105, p = .000), other immigrants from the FSU (r = .220, 
n = 108, p = .022), and immigrants from other countries (r = .346, n = 104, p = .000).  Not 
surprisingly, feelings of connectedness to country of origin strongly and positively correlated to 
connectedness to local neighborhood in country of origin (r = .770, n = 109, p = .000), but it also 
negatively correlated to connectedness to the U.S. (r = -.212, n = 108, p = .027).     
 Remittances. The number of times a respondent sent money back to family and friends in 
country of origin positively correlated with education level (r = .211, n = 125, p = .018), 
connectedness to country of origin (r = .405, n = 121, p = .000), and to local neighborhood in 
country of origin (r = .339, n = 109, p = .000).  The correlation between education and remittance 
behavior is not surprising as those with a higher education are more likely to find better paying 
jobs which gives them more income.  The most interesting connections in this group are between 
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remittances and feelings of connectedness to one’s country or origin as well as one’s local 
neighborhood in country of origin.  Even though this correlation does not necessarily imply 
causation, it would be helpful to explore why there is a connection between feelings of 
connectedness to place and remittance behavior.  Does the connection to place encourage one to 
send money more often?  Or, does the act of sending remittances make one feel more strongly 
connected to their place of origin?  Remittance behavior is further explored below in the section 
on hypotheses.   
Hypotheses 
My original research question was, “To what extent does a Soviet legacy shape the 
experiences of immigrants from the FSU in the U.S.?” From the literature and my own 
experiences, three categories emerged to organize hypotheses for testing:  refugee status, 
titularity and ethnicity.  I test the association and independence of variables relevant to my 
hypotheses using chi squared, Fisher’s exact tests, a logistic regression and t-tests on my survey 
data.  I also use coded interview data to explore the substance of the hypotheses.  Below is a 
review of the results of the hypothesis testing and relevant qualitative findings.  Appendix E also 
summarizes the hypothesis findings. 
Refugee Status/ Institutional Support 
I asked respondents in my survey to identify the types of help they used when they 
immigrated to the U.S.  These responses fell into two categories: formal and informal 
institutions.  Formal institutions include official entities such as governmental as well as non-
governmental organizations.  Informal institutions included friends, family, and even non-official 
entities such as “underground” employment agencies.  The complexity of varying kinds of 
institutions emerged during interviews, but for the purposes of the analysis of the survey data my 
categories for formal institutions were “U.S. Government; State Government; Local 
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Government; Church/Synagogue/Mosque; Community/Non-Profit Organization,” and informal 
institutions were “Family; Friends.”  My hypothesis for refugee status was: 
H1 Refugees from the FSU rely on formal institutions (such as government programs, 
community organizations, and religious institutions) after immigration while non-
refugees rely on informal institutions (such as friends and family members) after 
immigration.   
 I conducted a chi-square test of association between refugee status and institutional support 
using the survey data and found support for this hypothesis in Brooklyn X2 (1, N=128) = 19.04, 
p<.01 and Nashville X2 (1, N=46) = 11.24, p<.01 (Table 11). What is interesting about this result 
is not that refugees relied on formal institutions when they immigrated, which is not surprising 
considering their automatic qualification for some programs, but that non-refugees typically did 
not get help from any kind of formal institution, even religious institutions or community 
organizations.   
Table 11:  Refugees and Institutional Support 
H1:  Refugees from the FSU will rely on formal institutions (government programs, community organizations, 
religious institutions, etc.) for adjustment purposes while non-refugees will rely on informal institutions (social 
networks, family members, etc.) for adjustment purposes. 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Institutional Support   
 Informal Formal   
Non-refugee 52 (91%) 5 (9%) 
19.04 0.000 
Refugee 40 (56%) 31 (44%) 
 Nashville   
 Institutional Support   
 Informal Formal   
Non-refugee 32 (91%)  3 (9%) 
11.24 0.001 
Refugee 5 (45%) 6 (55%) 
 
 Survey respondents were asked on whom or what institution did they rely for help when 
they first moved to the US.  Respondents could select more than one answer.  About 17.6% of 
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Brooklyn respondents and 26.1% of Nashville indicated “other,” with virtually all blanks being 
filled in with some variation of “myself” or “nothing”.  The breakdown of other responses is as 
follows with Brooklyn and Nashville listed respectively:  U.S. government (18.3%; 13%); state 
government (5.3%; 2.2%); local government (3.1%; 2.2%); church/synagogue/mosque (0.8%; 
8.7%); community/non-profit organization (5.3%; 10.9%); family (44.3%; 41.3%); friends 
(16.8%; 17.4%).  The largest category is “family.”  This is consistent with what Borjas (1989) 
describes as family serving as a typical safety-net for immigrants when they newly arrive in the 
U.S.   If “friends” were to be added to the “family” category, then in both research sites, friends 
and family would make up the majority support mechanism for FS immigrants when they arrive 
in the U.S.   
 In interviews, few people talked about their reliance on government institutions, even 
though half of them (N=13) had refugee or asylum status at one point.  Their view and/or 
memory of adjustment were of assistance through self-reliance and informal institutions 
(friends/family).  When I probed about their possible reliance on government institutions, the 
reaction was typically a hypothetical one.  If pushed, they might call the police or expect the 
government to support them when they get older.  There was one particular refugee interview 
during which I probed further when it was obvious that the respondent relied on formal 
institutional assistance.  He was living with his family in public housing, and he mentioned 
applying for food stamps while he talked about struggling with the English language (Interview 
4124-Brooklyn).   
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 Interviewer:  Whom do you rely on for help? 
Respondent:  I don’t believe to in any organization, in government. I don’t believe in it.  
We have a situation when we had no help from no one.  We just trust each other.  We just 
hope for the best.   
I:  Did you have a bad experience?  You said you got food stamps when you first moved 
– (cut off) 
R:  No, when you take the person in a very bad situation and you put them in a situation 
that is not that bad, you just get excited.  You’re happy.  If you ask me now?  You ask me 
about that situation now?  It’s nothing. It’s difficult for me to ask help.  I’m not that 
person.  I’m thinking about myself and I understand that you can’t get help now.  Here in 
this country is based on the self.  Self-improvement. 
His situation was further complicated by having a child with autism.  He said that his wife cannot 
work because she needs to care for their son full time. He was clearly bothered when it came to 
the question of government or any kind of outside help.  Based on his responses, I felt he 
believed he was entitled to help for the hardships he has faced, but at the same time felt guilty, 
maybe even ashamed, about not being self-reliant.  I did ask him about his experience with 
public housing, and how long it took him to get into his apartment. 
R:  We didn’t wait for the long time, but we want to get some better area.  This area is not 
that good for a family.   
 The physical environment was intimidating in public housing in Coney Island.   Graffiti 
is just about anywhere there is a surface big enough to make a letter, and lettering rather than 
imagery was about all there was to the graffiti of Coney Island public housing.  There were no 
colorful murals, only gang signs and personal initials.  Even the taxi cabs were not immune from 
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graffiti. In New York City, most public housing is high-rise and contains enclosed stairwells.  In 
Nashville, public housing is mostly low-rise with more open staircases.  The smell of urine hits 
you almost immediately in the enclosed spaces in NY public housing, especially the rickety 
elevator we took four floors up.  The first impression of my respondent’s apartment was 
“concrete.”  No amount of Central Asian adornment could mask the concrete box in which this 
family of four lived.    
 Only one respondent mentioned her reliance on Medicaid for help with her son because 
he was born with a disability.  She is a 52-year-old non-refugee Georgian who works in the 
billing department of a transportation company in New York.  In Georgia, she was a scientist 
(hydrotechnician) and has a degree in engineering.  Conversely, other respondents shared their 
reluctance to rely on formal institutions, especially government ones.  This may stem from the 
normalcy of corruption in FS republics as reported by virtually all respondents.  For example, an 
Uzbek from Uzbekistan working in Nashville as a part-time bank teller commented that he does 
not trust the government anywhere, including the U.S, and would not want to rely on them for 
any kind of help.  Other immigrants looked negatively on those who used the government for 
financial support.  Another non-titular Uzbek immigrant from Nashville said,  
Respondent:  I don’t like to rely on the government.  I had to wait six years to get my 
permanent residence and first thing I did, I went to buy health insurance.  First thing a lot 
of people do when they get their greencard is get on welfare.  This is. . . I don’t like it.  
Because somebody is working.  And you do nothing?   
I:  Did you have any kind of assistance when you were waiting to get your permanent 
residency?  Any kind of medical or food assistance? 
R:  No, nothing. 
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However, one of two undocumented immigrants I interviewed reported his faith in U.S. 
institutions and people to help him if he really needs it, no matter his legal status:   
I’m legal or illegal. I’m in this country, so I’m human too.  So the paper, because I don’t 
have a paper doesn’t mean I’m not a human.  If I need help, I’m sure that everybody is 
going to help me – somehow, you know?  Maybe not like fully, but somehow they are 
going to help me.  So I’m sure because it’s democracy.   
One Russian Nashville immigrant who was trafficked as a hotel maid noted that she trusts the 
police and other government institutions, but did not have any luck with a human rights 
organization in Kentucky when she was victimized.  She shrugged at my surprise when she told 
me that the organization was not helpful to her.  Her reasoning was that her language must have 
not been very good at the time and that is probably why the human rights organization did not 
follow-up with her when she reported it.  Fortunately, the trafficking ring was busted by police 
and because she was a legal immigrant, she was able to find work elsewhere.  Unfortunately this 
did not happen before she experienced abuse at the hand of her employer.  She reported to me 
that she was hit in the face, threatened and yelled at constantly.   
 Another respondent (titular Georgian, documented and non-refugee immigrant) living in 
Brooklyn noted that she may have to rely on the government if she was ever “really in trouble,” 
but “thank God I’ve never needed to (collect unemployment).”  In a follow-up discussion to the 
interview, she mentioned she was frustrated with a Jewish immigrant friend of hers who talked 
about how the immigration experience is not as bad as he hears from other immigrants.  She 
noted that he gets help with housing and other assistance from Jewish community organizations 
and the government.  She told me that there have been times she has been close to being “out on 
the street,” because she does not get any formal support. Her case is also an example of 
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deskilling.  She has a degree in computer science and speaks three languages fluently, but like 
many female FS immigrants in Brooklyn, she works as a home healthcare attendant.   
 The support that Jewish immigrants receive (or are perceived to receive) came up several 
times in interviews and informal conversations. Non-Jewish immigrants believed the help Jewish 
immigrants receive is unfair.  When asked about her general feelings towards other immigrants 
from the FSU, a titular Ukrainian immigrant in Nashville with a Ph.D. who has not experienced 
deskilling put it this way:  
Generally, the Jewish community, the immigration community from former Soviet 
Union, I do not like very much.  And I will explain why.  Because they take too much 
from the country than give back.  This is my personal opinion – from this country.  And 
because of the Jewish lobby, they get things that other nationalities from the former 
Soviet Union couldn’t get. 
Several non-Jewish respondents acknowledged rampant and sanctioned discrimination against 
Jews in former Soviet republics (during and after the Soviet period), but they still took issue with 
any special treatment Jewish immigrants received in the U.S.  Ethnicity and ethnic tension are 
explored later, but another source of differing experiences for immigrants is based on titularity.   
Titularity 
 Considering a combination of factors from empirical literature and established migration 
theories, the following hypotheses on titularity were formed and supported by data analysis for 
the Brooklyn sample (N=131). 
H2:  Non-titular immigrants are more likely to report experiences of ethnic discrimination 
as a reason for leaving their country of origin than titular immigrants.    
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Table 12:  Titularity and Push Factors 
H2:  Non-titular persons will be more likely to report experiences of ethnic discrimination as a reason for leaving their 
country of origin than will titular persons.  
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 39 (67%) 19 (33%) 
16.32 0.000 
Titular 68 (94%) 4 (6%) 
 Nashville   
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 4 (44%) 5 (56%) 
17.83 0.000 
Titular 36 (97%) 1 (3%) 
 
 A chi-square test of association was conducted to test this hypothesis.  The connection 
between reasons for emigrating and non-titular persons was significant for those who reported 
ethnic discrimination in Brooklyn (X2 (1, N=131) = 16.32, p<.01) and Nashville (X2 (1, N=46) = 
17.83, p<.01) as a reason for leaving (Table 12). In both samples, titular immigrants were far less 
likely to leave because of ethnic discrimination than were non-titular immigrants. In the original 
hypothesis, I included the immigration year of 1996 or earlier as a factor.  Based on scholarly 
literature, those leaving their country of origin in the FSU before 1996 did so because of ethnic 
tensions; by 1996 civil turmoil was abating.  I did a cross-tabulation analysis of the association 
between period of immigration and ethnic discrimination as a push factor using non-titular 
immigrants in both samples.  In Brooklyn, 44% of the total sample was non-titular.  Of this non-
titular subsample, 34% of those who immigrated before 1996 claimed ethnic discrimination as a 
push factor and 30% of those immigrated in 1996 or later claimed ethnic discrimination as a push 
factor, but the differences were not significant.  Therefore, 1996 as a dividing year does not seem 
to matter (Table 13).  
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Table 13:  Titularity and Push Factors (Immigrated before 1996) 
H2a:  Non-titular persons who immigrated before 1996 will be more likely to report experiences of ethnic 
discrimination as a reason for leaving their country of origin than will titular persons.  
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Immigrated before 1996 23 (66%) 12 (44%) ns ns 
Immigrated in 1996 or later 16 (70%) 7 (30%) 
 Nashville   
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Immigrated before 1996 3 (43%) 4 (57%) 
ns ns 
Immigrated in 1996 or later 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 
 
 In the interviews, a couple of respondents spoke of religion-based discrimination. All 
non-titular interview respondents except one who talked about experiences of ethnic 
discrimination in their countries of origin were from Central Asia or the Transcaucasus. One 
non-titular immigrant from Eastern Europe who emigrated from Russia to Nashville because of 
ethnic and religious persecution did so in the 1970s.  His experiences of discrimination were 
especially severe because his family was German and Lutheran.  He reported that family 
members were jailed and he was constantly harassed in high school.   
 One ethnic Russian from Georgia living in Brooklyn reported the following experience of 
feeling as if she belonged nowhere in the FSU: 
The situation was very bad there (in Georgia) for my family.  There were problems about 
nationalism.  In my job, even if I did everything well, there was always a problem 
because I was Russian.  When I was in Russia, people told me I was Georgian not 
Russian.  And I had some problems there too. When I was studying in Russia, I felt more 
discriminated against in Russia than in Georgia.  In Russia, they considered me Georgian 
and told me I was Georgian even though I was Russian. 
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A couple of non-Uzbek immigrants reported on their experiences in Uzbekistan.  When I asked 
one young woman why her family left Uzbekistan, she looked at me as if it was obvious.  “Well, 
we’re not Uzbek.”  She went on to explain how bad the discrimination against non-Uzbeks was 
in the 1990s, when her family left Uzbekistan.  “There was no future for us,” she concluded.  
Another non-Uzbek (Kazakh) immigrant went as far as to make sure his passport indicated his 
ethnicity was Uzbek so he would not have any trouble securing a visa to leave.  The third 
hypothesis of this research projects is connected to the aforementioned desire to leave one’s 
country of origin permanently or temporarily depending on titularity:   
H3:  Titular immigrants are more likely to be temporary immigrants and intend to return 
home to live. 
Table 14:  Titularity and Intentions to Return to Country of Origin   
H3:  Titular immigrants will more likely be temporary immigrants, intending to return home to live  
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Intend to return to country of origin to live   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 48 (89%) 6 (11%) 
6.83 0.009 Titular 47 (69%) 21 (31%) 
 Nashville 
 Intend to return to country of origin to live   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 9 (100%) 0 (0%) 
4.09 0.043 
Titular 24 (67%) 12 (33%) 
 
 I conducted a chi-square test of association to test this hypothesis.  The connection 
between titularity and intentions to return home to live was significant for Brooklyn (X2 (1, 
N=122) = 6.83, p<.01) and Nashville samples (X2 (1, N=45) = 4.09, p<.05) (Table 14).  But 
intention to return home is a complicated topic when one considers the interview responses.  
Very few people talked in depth about their desire to return to their country of origin to live.  
Most of those who expressed a desire to return said it depended on how their country develops in 
the future.  For a few respondents, it was their cities to which they were most connected 
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(Moscow, Kiev, and Tashkent) rather than their country of origin.  Of the total sample (N=176), 
85% came from urban areas in their countries of origin.  
 For those who expressed a desire to stay connected to their countries (cities) of origin, 
many did not find returning to live in their home country to be practical.  The discussion of this 
also shows how complicated the migration process becomes even if there is a deep nostalgia for 
one’s place of origin.  Some immigrants have children born in the US.  Others remember a place 
of origin that is no longer there.  The following interview responses about possibly returning to 
countries of origin come from titular immigrants. 
 A Russian immigrant from Moscow talked about her longing to return to Russia.  She 
feels isolated living outside of Nashville and does not feel like she has adjusted well in Davidson 
County.  In fact, her summary of where she is living now was “I moved from the capital of 
Russia to the capital of rednecks.”  However, when I asked her about returning to Russia to live, 
she responded:   
Right now, it would be a really hard decision to go back to Russia because I lost my 
apartment there, so it’s like chasing a train.   My son is American, so it would be a broken 
family.  If I could, I would have a place to live there and travel back and forth and have a 
job there, because it’s easier for me to get a job there.  I’m from Moscow and several 
generations lived there.  There is a huge difference in Russia between the capital and the 
other cities. 
Another respondent longed for her city of origin, Kiev (Ukraine).  Her narrative about Kiev 
seemed as though she was talking about an attachment to a person rather than a geographic 
space:   
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You need to understand one thing.  Everything that I remember and am attached to is 
already 20 years old.  So Kiev is not as it used to be when I was there.  I remember very 
vividly in 2003, when at the middle of Khreschatyk Street, I just dropped down into tears 
because I couldn’t recognize my city. My husband was freaking out because he couldn’t 
understand.  He didn’t grow up in Kiev, but he is also very attached to the city.  I’ve been 
in a lot of cities, but Kiev has a very interesting personality.  It has a soul, essentially.  
And everybody who spends time there has a special relationship (with it) especially if 
you were born there and lived your life there.  It’s very eclectic because it doesn’t have a 
very specific style of architecture, unlike St. Petersburg, because it (St. Petersburg) was 
created as a city, a European capital city, with the straight radial streets.  Kiev is very old.  
And it just grew as life was going on, so there is no regularity about Kiev at all.  It’s very 
eclectic.  It (was) allowed to develop in small parts.  (There are) very quiet spaces, places 
where you would have one bench surrounded by a couple of trees and bushes and it’s 
already in a very special atmosphere.  It’s very different now.  A lot of buildings are 
coming down and it’s changing.  And I’m talking about the older part.  What I like about 
the newer part, very interesting now – it’s very megapolis looking.  (There are) very high 
apartment buildings with interesting architecture. So especially on the left bank of the 
Dniepr, Kiev is very green.  There (are) a lot of trees, parks and a lot tree boulevards.  
And it is on hills.  Not a lot of churches, but they are very distinct churches, and there are 
still some monasteries.  It’s very interesting architecture and interesting feeling around 
them.  This is how I see it. 
Another titular respondent spoke of his home city, Taskhent, with great affection and also 
supported the people of his country in hope they would revolt.  But he was proud of Uzbekistan’s 
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history as a part of the Great Silk Road.  His reluctance to return was based on government 
corruption:     
Respondent:  Well, when I came to the US, I made a goal and a commitment.  I want to 
be able to use that degree.  But if I can’t use my degree in Uzbekistan because of 
corruption, then I’ll want to stay in the US.  People (in Uzbekistan) are very hospitable.  
They invite people to their house, make them food, etc. I’m really disappointed in the 
government.  I’m really hopeful that one day, people will stick together and revolutionize 
the government.  And I really hope people will start living better.  I know someone who 
is an asylee (in the U.S.).  She is an active member in a political organization. They are 
trying to tell people to connect together to fight against the government to remove the 
president.  But it’s been hard.  Someone has to tell the people from the outside, to get to 
the public.   
I:  How big is this movement?   
R:  There are like 2 or 3 organizations.  The movement is pretty strong.  But in terms of 
being effective, there is this cynicism that they (Uzbek government) will send people here 
to kill them.  They (Uzbek immigrants) still have that mentality.  
Another example of support for revolution came up during an interview with a Ukrainian from 
Ukraine.  She sent money to Ukraine during the mid-2000s to support the Orange Revolution.  It 
seems that titularity may matter when it comes to remittance behavior.  Thus, my final 
hypothesis concerning titularity was: 
H4:  Titular immigrants are more likely to send remittances to their country of origin and 
they remit more frequently than non-titular immigrants. 
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Table 15:  Titularity and Remittances   
H4:  Titular immigrants will more likely and more frequently send remittances to their country of origin than 
will non-titular immigrants. 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Send Remittances?   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 31 (55%) 25 (45%) 
8.96 0.003 Titular 21 (29%) 51 (71%) 
 Nashville 
 Send Remittances?   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 4 (44%) 5 (56%) 
ns ns 
Titular 10 (28%) 26 (72%) 
 
Send Remittances to County of Origin:  1=Never, 2=Once every few years, 
3=Once a year, 4=A few times a year, 5=Once a month 
 N Mean Rank 
Mann-Whitney 
U p 
 Brooklyn   
Non-Titular 56 54.86 
1476 0.014 
Titular 72 72 
 Nashville   
Non-Titular 9 16.50 103.50 ns 
Titular 36 24.63 
 
 This hypothesis was split into two tests:  a chi square test to test the association between 
titularity and remittance activity, and a Mann-Whitney test to determine if titular immigrants 
more frequently sent remittances. Both showed significance (Table 15) for the Brooklyn sample.  
The chi square test showed that non-titular immigrants were more likely to report that they never 
send remittances back to their country of origin but was statistically significant for Brooklyn 
only (X2 (1, N=128) = 8.96, p<.01).  For the Mann-Whitney test, there was a significant 
difference in remittance frequency (1=never, 2=once every few months, 3=once a year, 4=a few 
times a year, 5=once a month) scores for titular (mean rank=72) and non-titular (mean 
rank=54.86) immigrants for the Brooklyn sample only. A higher mean rank means that 
remittances are sent more frequently.  More specifically, a much larger percentage of titular 
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immigrants than non-titular immigrants send remittances relatively frequently (a few times a year 
or once a month) in Brooklyn (48 percent versus 29 percent) and Nashville (50 percent versus 11 
percent). Therefore, not only are titular more likely to send remittances to their countries of 
origin, but they also more frequently send them than do non-titular immigrants.  The data are in 
the same direction for the Nashville sample even though the tests were not statistically 
significant.     
 The interviews revealed that remittances support individuals (friends and family) and 
institutions (orphanages and political movements).  Some remittances are in-kind in the forms of 
gifts and clothes.  Respondents reported that cash remittances were sometimes intended to 
supplement someone’s income and for others it was their only means of survival. It is important 
to look at what the qualitative data say in terms of use and purposes of remittances in reference 
to titularity of immigrants.  
 A couple of interviewees from Brooklyn (both non-titular) send clothes and toiletries to 
their friends and family.  One respondent, who reported that she sends her father care packages, 
reported that he often does not use what she sends him.  He saves it.  She talked about a nice 
Adidas top she once sent him, and he never wore it because he did not want to ruin it. Another 
non-titular immigrant talked about organizing missionary trips to orphanages in Russia, but he 
does not send them money directly.   
 Respondents often reported that the cash remittances they send to their countries of origin 
are supplemental.  A Georgian immigrant from Georgia said at one point she supported her sister 
who is a single mother.  However, as the economic situation and salaries are improving in 
Georgia, she sends less and less as time passes.  Another titular immigrant from Ukraine sends 
cash money with friends who are traveling to Kiev to give to his late father’s wife.  The 
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respondent did not get to know this woman until his father’s funeral, but then decided to start 
helping her with income to supplement her pension.  Another titular immigrant from Uzbekistan 
talked about his grandmother’s use of supplemental money from the remittances he sends to her: 
Sometimes I send a couple of hundred dollars as a gift to my grandmother.  She’s almost 
80 years old.  She likes to buy stuff for neighbors, to cook something.  I send her money 
maybe every one and a half years or something.   
However, for some respondents’ friends and family, remittances are crucial for basic needs.  A 
Georgian immigrant from Georgia pays for his sister’s mortgage in Tbilisi.  An Uzbek immigrant 
from Uzbekistan talked about supporting his parents because they are on pensions but are trying 
to support other family members in Uzbekistan: 
My parents are on a pension, and that is not enough for them.  They have grandchildren 
and my brother is really struggling with the job.  It’s a big family.  They live all together 
in one house.  Three families in one house.  Five kids.  It’s a lot of expenses. 
When I asked one Georgian immigrant from Georgia about the remittances she sends to her 
friends and family, she said they relied on her support.  I asked her what kind of situation they 
would be in if she did not send them money.  Her response was, “Stark.”   
 Finally, there were some respondents who reported that their worsening financial 
situation in the U.S. prevents them from continuing to send remittances to family members in 
their countries of origin. A Russian immigrant from Russia who is struggling to find work 
reported that she used to send her family money, but they could support her now.  Another 
unemployed immigrant (Tajik from Uzbekistan) in Brooklyn also reported that she used to send 
remittances but no longer can afford it.   An undocumented construction worker (Georgian from 
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Georgia) in Brooklyn talked about how difficult it was for him to send money home to his 
family.  In fact, they wind up supporting him sometimes.   
I’m sending some presents to my nieces and nephews.  But not really, to be honest.  Only 
sometimes.  When I first was here, I was sending money for some time.  But for an illegal 
guy (who) is alone, I have to do everything by myself.  Until I find a good job, it’s 
difficult. . . There was one time when I cut my hand, hard. (My brother) sent me $2000 
for surgery.  He’s in Georgia.  He is supporting me very hard.  If I need it and it’s 
necessary, he will sell his car; he will sell his house and support me with everything. 
Ethnicity 
 Ethnicity was the third category potentially affecting how a Soviet legacy has shaped the 
experience of immigrants from the FSU.  Two of the three hypotheses in this category were not 
supported using the Brooklyn sample, but surprisingly, one hypothesis was statistically 
significant in Nashville but not Brooklyn.    
H5:  Russians feel less connected to other immigrants from the FSU than non-Russians. 
Table 16:  Ethnicity and Connectedness 
H5:  Russians will feel less connected to other immigrants from the FSU than will non-Russians 
 
How strongly connected do you feel to other immigrants from FS republics?  1=Not 
at all, 2=Somewhat, 3=Strongly, 4=Very Strongly 
 M SD t-test p 
 Brooklyn   
Non-Russian 2.46 0.78 
ns ns 
Russian 2.53 0.92 
 Nashville   
Non-Russian 2.36 0.79 
ns ns 
Russian 2.45 0.76 
 
The mean scores for non-Russians in Brooklyn and Nashville were slightly lower than for 
Russians, but given their standard deviations, they
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this hypothesis was not supported by the survey data, there are interview data that give insight 
into how Russian colonial power influences the experiences and perceptions of FS immigrants.   
 For two respondents, Russian culture and language were positive and unifying forces 
before and after the Soviet period.  A Jewish immigrant from Russia remembered the Soviet 
period fondly, and she looks negatively upon those who stress their ethnic differences.   
Respondent:  It was better in the Soviet Union.  Now in Russia, when there are 
Armenians, Georgians, whoever, people would stress their difference.  But in the Soviet 
Union, it was normal to see others.  Now, and not just in Russia, it’s an issue.   
Interviewer:  What do you tell your children about the Soviet period? 
R:  I tell them about Russian culture, its theatres, books, movies, and so on.   
A young Russian woman from Uzbekistan whose family left because they were not Uzbek also 
noted the positive influence of the Russian language in Central Asia for people who did not feel 
at home in Uzbekistan because of their ethnicity. 
Respondent: Over here (U.S), it’s so many different cultures.  Over there it was only five 
percent of Russian speakers in all of Uzbekistan, and we would stick together.   
Interviewer:  So even during the Soviet period, it was only a small percentage?   
R:  I’m not sure.   No, I don’t think so – it was bigger.  But after collapse, people moving 
out.  But Ukrainians, Koreans, we all stick together.  Over here it’s different. I find it 
easier to connect to people of the same background (speak Russian) as I am.  Let’s say 
Georgians.   
The positive or nostalgic views of Russian influence in former Soviet republics expressed above 
were not echoed by other respondents, including an ethnic Russian from Georgian.  However, it 
is important to note that though she experienced discrimination in Georgia because she was an 
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ethnic Russian, she reported her treatment while attending school in Russia was much worse.  
Russians saw her as a Georgian, even though her ethnicity was Russian.  She reported to me that 
the Soviet Union was “represented by lies,” but people throughout the Soviet Union could not 
see that, especially Russians.  Another immigrant from Georgia, an ethnic Georgian, put it this 
way, “During the Soviet time, we were all one unit, but Russia believed that all republics 
belonged to Russia.”  A titular immigrant from Ukraine also commented that the Soviet Union 
should not be considered a Soviet empire. “It was (a) Russian empire.  It was Russia and 
everything it accumulated through different ways, usually not very good ones.”   
 The legacy of the Russian empire was pointed out by several respondents. A titular 
immigrant from Uzbekistan talked about how Russian is still seen as the language of educated 
people in Uzbekistan because many official forms remain in Russian even though Uzbek is now 
the official language.  He also noted the discrimination ethnic Russians from Uzbekistan 
experience when they move to Russia.  “They are actually being discriminated against by their 
own people, by Russian people.  Even if they look totally Russian, Russian people (from Russia) 
don’t see them as Russian.”  Also, a Georgian journalist from Georgia talked about her 
experience working for a Russian-language newspaper in New York.  She reported that she quit 
because it was very “pro-Russian” and problems arose for her during the Russia-Georgian war of 
2008.   
 Although some non-Russian interviewees said it was just easier to say they were Russian 
to Americans, there were a few who found it offensive to be called Russian, and told me that 
they make it a point to correct people when they mistake them as Russians. One Georgian 
respondent reported that he would rather be thought of as any ethnicity but Russian.  
Interviewer:  What ethnicity do people think you are?   
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Respondent:  Russian.   
I:  Do you ever just give in and say, “Yeah, I’m Russian”? 
R: No!  I would say I was Italian or something.  No, no.  I’m not Russian.  I can speak my 
own language, and no Russian would understand me. 
I:  Do you speak Russian? 
R:  Yes.  My generation was the last generation to have mandatory Russian in school.  
Examples of ethnic discrimination are peppered throughout the above interview excerpts.  The 
academic literature and theories on migration often refer to a global ethno-racial hierarchy that 
shapes the experiences of immigrants.  Therefore, I attempted to create a hypothesis to capture 
this experience and how it may affect adjustment processes for immigrants from the FSU.   
H6a: Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to report experiences of discrimination 
in the U.S. based on ethnicity. 
H6b: Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to express a transnational identity.  
Table 17:  Ethnicity and Experiences of Discrimination in the U.S. 
H6a:  Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to report experiences of discrimination in the U.S. based on 
ethnicity. 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 
Have you ever experienced discrimination in U.S. based 
on ethnicity?    
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 44 (71%) 18 (29%) 
ns ns 
Jewish 21 (66%) 11 (44%) 
Transcaucasian 17 (81%) 4 (19%) 
Central Asian 8 (62%) 5 (38%) 
 Nashville   
 
Have you ever experienced discrimination in U.S. based 
on ethnicity?    
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 10 (31%) 22 (69%) 
NA* 0.05 
Jewish 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 
Transcaucasian 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 
Central Asian 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 
* Fisher’s Exact Test done in lieu of Chi Square test, because of low expected values in some cells. 
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 H6a was not supported for the Brooklyn sample but it was for the Nashville sample using 
Fisher’s exact test (p=0.05) (Table 17).  The difference between the Brooklyn and Nashville 
samples is notable.  For European non-Jews, the experience of discrimination was quite different 
in Brooklyn and Nashville.  Although this group may be considered “white” in the ethno-racial 
spectrum, a larger percentage of Europeans living in Nashville (69%) noted experiencing 
discrimination based on ethnicity than did Europeans living in Brooklyn (29%). Even though the 
survey question specified discrimination based on ethnicity, respondents may have been 
responding about experiences of discrimination based on numerous indicators of difference.  
This topic is picked up below in the discussion on interview responses.   Ethno-racial differences 
may be at play as well.  This is likely the case for the Central Asian respondents.  All Central 
Asian respondents in Nashville reported feeling discriminated against because of ethnicity, but 
only 38% of the Central Asian Brooklyn sample reported the same experience.   
 Hypothesis H6b was supported using the Brooklyn sample (X2 (3, N=119) = 18.615, 
p<.01) only (Table 18).  In Brooklyn, European Non-Jewish and Jewish ethnic groups are much 
less likely than Transcaucasian and Central Asian ethnic groups to call their country of origin 
home.  However, in Nashville 42% of the European non-Jewish respondents considered their 
country of origin “home” as opposed to only 18% of European non-Jewish respondents in 
Brooklyn.   
 This expression of transnational identity may tie back to titularity.  Therefore, the 
question is whether titularity is really predicting a transnational identity instead of ethnicity.  To 
test for that, using the Brooklyn sample, I conducted a logistic regression using transnational 
identity (yes/no) as the dependent variable and ethnic category and titularity as the covariates.  
The Nagelkerke R2 for this model is 0.268.   Controlling for titularity, Transcaucasian and 
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Central Asian ethnic groups had a higher probability of having a transnational identity than did 
European non-Jewish and Jewish ethnic groups, and titularity was not a significant predictor 
(Table 19).   
Table 18:  Ethnicity and Transnational Identity 
H6b:  Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to express a transnational identity.  (Transnational identity = country 
of origin is "home.") 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Country of Origin is "Home"   
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 47 (82%) 10 (18%) 
18.615 0.000 
Jewish 31 (97%) 1 (3%) 
Transcaucasian 10 (56%) 8 (44%) 
Central Asian 6 (50%) 6 (50%) 
 Nashville 
 Country of Origin is "Home"   
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 18 (58%) 13 (42%) 
na* ns 
Jewish 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Transcaucasian 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 
Central Asian 2 (40%) 3 (60%) 
* Fisher’s Exact Test done in lieu of Chi Square test, because of low expected values in some cells. 
 
Table 19:  Logistic Regression for Transnational Identity 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig.  Exp(B) 
Ethnic Category (European 
non-jewish is contrast) 
  11.004 3 0.012  
Ethnic Category (Jewish) -1.399 1.18 1.406 1 0.236 0.247 
Ethnic Category 
(Transcaucasian) 
1.464 0.593 6.104 1 0.013 4.324 
Ethnic Category (Central 
Asian) 
1.464 0.681 4.62 1 0.032 4.324 
Titularity (Yes=1) 0.682 0.639 1.142 1 0.285 1.979 
Constant -2.035 0.599 11.529 1 0.001 0.131 
 
 Discrimination comes in many forms, and discrimination was the most “grounded” code 
of the interview data.  With my hypothesis, I focused on experiences of discrimination in the 
U.S. based on race/ethnicity and how that might shape an immigrant’s experience of 
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incorporation and adjustment.  What my interview respondents revealed to me was that 
discrimination is a multifaceted experience for immigrants in countries of origin and/or 
destination.  For this study, cases of discrimination were based on race/ethnicity, religion, 
language ability/accent, and gender.  Many respondents expressed discriminatory attitudes 
towards others as well.   
 Ethnicity.  Ethnicity or perceived ethnicity was the most frequently discussed reason for 
discrimination. Only one respondent reported an experience of violence based on ethnic 
discrimination. Even though she suggested that the discrimination she experienced was not too 
concerning for her, here is her report of it in Uzbekistan. 
Interviewer:  Did you even feel discriminated against in Uzbekistan? 
Respondent:  Yes.  It was mostly ethnic.  I was, as I said, a teenager when I lived there.  
No major issues.   
I:  How could you tell you were being discriminated against?   
R:  Some people would tell me ‘Go back to your Russia.’ They would treat me as 
Russian.  As long as you’re not Uzbek, you get discriminated against.  They throw stones 
at you.   
I:  Did they ever throw stones at you?   
R: Oh yeah.  People my age, bigger guys.  When I was walking in my neighborhood.   
A titular immigrant from Uzbekistan reported his experiences of discrimination brought on by 
his marriage to a Russian woman.  He said that “the chance to be yourself” regardless of who 
you are or who you marry is what he likes the most about living in the U.S.  Because he was 
married to a Russian, he said that in Uzbekistan “people talk about me; people point at me; 
people ignore me.”  A non-titular (Tajik) immigrant from Uzbekistan experienced religious 
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discrimination in Uzbekistan (see below) and ethnic discrimination in the U.S.  However, her 
experience of discrimination in the U.S. was with a Jewish family from Samarkand (Uzbekistan).  
She worked for the family as a nanny and was not allowed to eat meals with them.  She said that 
she was surprised because “we spoke the same language.”  It was hard to discern whether she felt 
discriminated against because of ethnicity or class.  She made it a point to say the family was 
Jewish, which denotes a difference in ethnicity, but the fact that she worked for them as a nanny 
suggests it may have been a perceived economic class difference.  Some other respondents 
reported that they felt discriminated against (in Brighton Beach only) because they were not 
Jewish.  One young Georgian woman said that she thinks Jews are insular in Brighton Beach, 
and said she heard a group of women talking about a non-Jewish acquaintance:  “Oh, she’s okay. 
Even though she’s not Jewish, but she’s still okay.”   
 Trying to understand why Jewish immigrants in Brighton Beach are insular or engage in 
discrimination is further complicated by the experiences of discrimination they faced in former 
Soviet republics.  Many respondents, including non-Jewish immigrants, noted in interviews the 
discrimination experienced by Jews in former Soviet republics.  One Jewish respondent shared 
with me her specific experiences of discrimination in Russia: 
It started in school.  I had problems.  I had to switch schools.  The principal in my school 
told me that I did not have a chance to go to university because I was Jewish.  The 
principal hated all Jewish people.  I was told that the university would only accept a few 
Jewish people.  But I was pretty lucky with work.  I worked with good people.  People in 
the streets would make comments . . . not always to me personally but in general.  For 
example, I would stand in line to get sausage and if it was all gone, people in front of me 
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would say ‘The sausage is all gone. It must be because of Jews.’ Anytime something 
went wrong, people would blame it on Jews. 
I asked her if she experienced any kind of discrimination in the U.S.  She said she had not, 
except for one time when an African American female on the subway called her “white trash.”  
She did not go into detail about the exchange or its context, but waved it off as “just talk.”  This 
is a good example of a Brooklyn respondent expanding on the reasons why someone might not 
have access to educational opportunities because of overt discrimination.  As was covered in the 
Brooklyn and Nashville sample comparison above, a higher proportion of survey respondents 
from Brooklyn rather than from Nashville cited educational opportunities for self or children as a 
reason for immigrating to the U.S.   
 Another immigrant from Belarus talked about discrimination in the U.S. in terms of racial 
conflicts between “white and black.”  She said, “As a white person, I have been afraid to walk 
past some high schools that are all black.”  Other immigrants picked up on the negative view of 
Latin American immigrants by much of the American public.  An Uzbek immigrant living in 
Nashville said that he experienced discrimination based on ethnicity in the U.S. only when he 
worked at a local grocery store, and even adopted the comments about Latin American 
immigrants.    
But sometimes, when I used to work at the Kroger, people (are) talking to you. For 
example, someone (would) come in and tell you, ‘You better go home’.  But they are 
talking about Mexicans and they (would) tell me, ‘I didn’t mean you, I didn’t mean you.  
I meant him.’ I don’t say anything.  But later I start joking myself.  ‘That damn Mexican.’    
One respondent, a titular immigrant from Georgia living in Nashville, talked about experiences 
of discrimination in the U.S. based on accent and language (more on this below).  I asked her if 
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she ever felt discriminated against because of her appearance. She said that she did not feel it, 
but her daughter did because “everyone thinks she’s Mexican because she has dark hair.”  I 
asked her if that bothered her.  “No.  It doesn’t bother me.  It bothers her.  I actually think it’s 
funny.”   
 Another respondent, a titular immigrant from Ukraine living in Nashville, talked about 
less overt experiences of discrimination in rural areas of the U.S.  He noted loving to travel 
across country in his car earlier in our interview. He said he felt discrimination,   
Sometimes, when you, for example, travel and you fill up at the gas station at a very rural 
area.  You feel that people don’t appreciate you.  But it’s. . . the difference is they 
couldn’t say anything because I’m a customer.  You feel that, but nobody makes a big 
deal out of that.  I pretend that I don’t notice it, and he pretends it (my foreignness) is not 
an issue.  It’s very rare.  Especially when you have a layer that’s not very well educated.  
Like in Ukraine, if you go to (a) working class area.  If you are black, for example – I 
wouldn’t go there.  But you can feel fine in the center of the city.   
The above is a rich and nuanced description of discrimination.  In several sentences, he captured 
discrimination as it is related to class, geography, overt discrimination tempered by a capitalist 
system and he even revealed some of his own biases. For many immigrants, discrimination 
becomes much more covert in form and expression than what they experienced in their countries 
of origin.  
 Religion.  Other immigrants experienced discrimination in their country of origin and/or 
the U.S. because of religion.  One experience was particularly violent.  This interview is seared 
in my memory, not only because of the experience of violence she reported but because of her 
overall demeanor.  She came to our interview out of breath.  She was in a hurry.  She had left her 
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baby in the care of a neighbor, but when she heard I was talking to FS immigrants about their 
experiences, she wanted to participate.  She was afraid her husband would find out that she left 
their baby with a neighbor for this interview.  In fact, he did not even know about the interview.  
She was dynamic and engaging and we conducted the interview in record time, but she got her 
points across to me.  I remember being surprised that she was wearing long-sleeves even though 
it was warm outside and stuffy inside.  Issues with religion first emerged when I asked her what 
she liked about living in the U.S. 
I like everything.  You can talk about religion.  It’s open, everything, not like in my 
country.  In my country, I’m Christian.  My sister is a pastor there. They caught her and 
put her in prison, and fined her a lot of money.   
I paused and had to gather myself.  I was taken off guard by how matter-of-fact her response 
seemed.  A few questions later, I asked her about her experiences with discrimination.  Again, I 
felt like I was slow to process what she was telling me.  She said she experienced discrimination 
in Uzbekistan, 
Because I’m a Christian.  When I changed my religion (from Muslim to Christian) they 
poured acid on me.   
Interviewer:  Wh-um-when did you . . . um . . .  change your religion?   
Respondent:  2000.  The imam’s son poured acid on me.   
Silence.  I fumbled through the rest of the interview while she looked at me intently.  After the 
interview, our mutual contact told me that she had seen the scars on her body.  They covered her 
arms and legs, and that is why she wears long sleeves no matter what the weather is outside.   
 Another moving example was offered by a titular Georgian immigrant.  She shared a 
vivid example of religious discrimination in Georgia during the Soviet period.   
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I was a religious person in Georgia, but only on the inside.  Once, when I was in college, 
I went to a church and lit a candle.  Some of the candle wax spilled on me and I couldn’t 
get it off.  I had to go back to class, and the professor was accusing me of being in 
church.  I didn’t know what to do.  He just spoke to me disapprovingly.   
An Uzbek immigrant in Nashville talked about the religious discrimination he experienced at 
work in Nashville because he was a Muslim.  Although he said he did not discuss religion very 
often because he felt that he was “not that religious,” he said his boss was a Church of Christ 
member and told him often that because he was Muslim he needed to “change his religion.”   
 Language.  Another basis for discrimination in the U.S. was an immigrant’s language 
ability or accent.  Even though one immigrant commented that Americans did not take issue with 
his inability to speak English, he heard it was harder for immigrants in Europe; others noted that 
language ability and accent were common indicators of difference.  The experiences of 
immigrants varied widely, from one who said she could sense negative perceptions only from 
“uneducated” Americans to one immigrant reporting that her experience with abuse as a 
trafficking victim was made worse because of language problems. As noted above, the victim of 
trafficking stated that her employers treated her badly because of her language ability.  She said 
it led her employer to assume she was an undocumented immigrant, and she believed it was the 
reason the human rights organization, to which she reported the abuse, did not follow up with 
her.   
 Gender.  An unexpected category for discussion on discrimination was gender.  Although 
only three interviewees spoke of gender explicitly, it is an important topic to include because of 
the interesting history of gender equality in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union, at least 
officially, was much more progressive than the U.S. when it came to gender.  It is beyond the 
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scope of this research project to engage in the complexities of gender, but it is widely 
acknowledged that women in the Soviet Union more rapidly moved closer to “official” equal 
treatment than did women in the U.S. during the same time period.  However, the realization of 
this equality should be taken with skepticism.  Official histories of the USSR, not unlike in many 
societies, were not always lived realities. 
 One non-titular immigrant from Uzbekistan reported that something that she “loved” 
about the U.S. was how women are treated.  She contrasted women’s treatment in the U.S. to 
how they are treated in Uzbekistan: “In my country, women are abused in the family.”  A 
Georgian immigrant from Georgia noted that she believed many women from former Soviet 
republics immigrate to the U.S. by way of marriage to American citizens.  She feared that 
because they are dependent on their husbands, they may be more susceptible to abuse by their 
American husbands.  And finally, a titular-Ukrainian immigrant shared how shocked she was by 
her treatment as a woman in the U.S.  She commented that gender equality was one of the 
positive influences of the Soviet period.  She said that because her workplace in academia is 
multicultural, she experiences gender discrimination from various cultures of the world.   
Respondent:  In research, we have a lot of Chinese and Indian population.  I have a lot of 
problems with people from India mostly based on their relations towards women.  So, 
and I understand every country has their own way to develop.  But I myself as a woman 
very often feel it.   
Interviewer:  Even at this very high level of work? 
R:  Exactly, and because of this – it’s very difficult to tolerate.   
I:  Is it condescending?  Or what is the relationship?   
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R:  They just – I need to think how to put it together.  In their personal lives – I observe a 
lot of families.  And it’s just a very subservient relationship from women and toward 
women.  But they accept it because of their history and culture.  For me, one of the best 
things that happened when the Soviet Union was formed – some were very good things 
happened, some were very bad.  But one of the good things, the best thing was the equal 
rights of women and men which actually was provided into life.  So I never had this 
feeling.  It actually happened when I came to US. And I was very surprised in a bad way.  
I was expecting it to be progressive in every way.  But it is not.  Every country has a lot 
of problems, but this is the thing that still does not fail to surprise me, the gender 
differences, specifically professional.  It takes me much more time and persuasion to 
show that essentially I am who I am.  And that I’m not taken as a woman but as a 
professional.  Just because a woman is supposed to be expected less.  So it surprises me 
very much.   
Conclusion 
 This Results chapter summarized what secondary and original data say about immigrants 
from FS republics living in the U.S., and specifically in two different immigrant destination 
cities:  Brooklyn and Nashville.  Some highlights of the secondary data analysis results include 
the following observations:  As a whole, the FS immigrant population is more formally educated 
than the total foreign-born population in the U.S.  However, FS immigrants on average have 
experienced higher rates of poverty than the general foreign-born population.  Native language 
retention at home is much higher among FS populations than the general foreign-born 
population.  In Nashville, FS immigrants do not tend to live in concentration as they do in 
Brooklyn.  They also do not tend to live near other foreign-born immigrants.  
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 Almost all hypothesis findings were in the same direction for Nashville and Brooklyn 
samples, even if some of the Nashville findings were not statistically significant.  I found that 
non-refugees were not likely to rely on formal institutions for adjustment help.  Titularity was a 
compelling variable for immigrant experiences.  Non-titular immigrants in Brooklyn and 
Nashville were more likely than titular immigrants to report ethnic discrimination as a reason for 
leaving their countries of origin.  Also, titular immigrants in both research sites were more likely 
than non-titular immigrants to report an intent to return to their country of origin to live 
someday.  For Brooklyn respondents only, titular immigrants more likely and more frequently 
than non-titular immigrants sent remittances to their countries of origin.  In Nashville only, a 
majority of European non-Jewish and Central Asian immigrants reported feeling discriminated 
against in the U.S. because of their ethnicity.  Finally, in Brooklyn only, the largest percentage of 
those who considered their country of origin as their home were ethnic Transcaucasian and 
Central Asian immigrants.  In this case, titularity was not a significant predictor. The Discussion 
chapter further summarizes this study’s results and ties them into the theoretical framework 
introduced earlier in the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of immigrants from FS 
republics in the U.S., a population relevant to migration scholars, non-migration scholars and 
non-scholars working in government and non-profit organizations.  In this study, I attempted to 
pull back the iron curtain that appears to have descended when it comes to this population.  I 
attempt to make visible what Kopnina (2005) referred to as an invisible population by using 
multiple methods of inquiry. Secondary data analysis provided an orientation to this population.  
Survey and interview research were used to explore this population in two contrasting research 
sites (Brooklyn and Nashville).   
Even though the surveys and interviews were designed and coded to understand their 
relevance in respect to the three a priori categories for research (refugee status, titularity, and 
ethnicity), numerous themes emerged inductively.  All of these themes and categories create an 
outline to better understand the Soviet legacy and why the FS region should be understood in its 
entirety rather than based on one particular country or ethnicity.  The Soviet period 
interconnected the various parts of this region, and some twenty-odd years later, that legacy 
remains relevant.  Immigration seems always a timely topic in the U.S., but it is especially 
relevant as our government attempts immigration reform, drawing academia and the public into 
debates about various facets of the issue.  This discussion chapter situates my results in the 
context of my theoretical and literature framework. I use an adaptation of Bronfenbrenner’s 
ecological model and frame the discussion as an “ecology of experience” for immigrants from 
the FSU living in the U.S.    
 
101 
 
Hypotheses 
 The general question of inquiry was, “To what extent does a Soviet legacy shape the 
experiences of immigrants from the FSU in the U.S.?”  From this question and the literature 
emerged three categories of inquiry that organized my hypotheses:  refugee status, titularity and 
ethnicity.   
Refugee status 
Refugee status is an obvious category for this study because it is tied to a Soviet legacy; 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, all immigrants from the USSR were granted refugee 
status in the U.S.  This policy continued after the collapse of the USSR because of the civil wars, 
ethnic backlash, and rising nationalism under the new era of multi-national independence.  
However, the post-Soviet era also brought in economic and other non-refugee immigrants to the 
U.S.  The introduction showed how a sociopolitical history combining community organizing 
and political action in the U.S., as well as state sanctioned anti-Semitism in the USSR, set into 
motion a steady flow of Jewish refugees from the USSR to the U.S.   
Liebert (2010) highlighted the importance of legal status because of varying outcomes for 
immigrants from Central Asia based on their immigrant status.  Those who could access formal 
institutions were less vulnerable to exploitation than those who could not access them because 
they were not documented immigrants.  Though my study only included a few undocumented 
immigrants, there was a variation in my participants’ legal status types.  Refugees and asylees 
automatically qualify for several government benefits, such as Medicaid, so I wanted to 
determine whether there was a difference in what types of support immigrants turned to based on 
differences in status.  I hypothesized that refugees are more likely to rely on formal institutions 
(government and community organizations) than non-refugees and non-refugees are more likely 
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to rely on informal institutions (family and friends) than refugees.  These hypothses were 
supported by survey data from Brooklyn and Nashville.  However, it should be noted that survey 
and interview data indicate that immigrants from the FSU (regardless of legal status) 
overwhelmingly rely on informal institutions for adjustment purposes.  There was a distrust and 
distaste for government support indicated by respondents.  This reality ties back to my discussion 
of “kitchen social capital,” presented in the literature review.   
Titularity 
Titularity emerged as the most interesting thematic category in this research, and it 
supports my inclination to treat the former Soviet Union together as a discrete region, but also to 
focus on the countries within it. The mix of titular and non-titular citizens in post-Soviet 
republics is tied to Soviet and continued post-Soviet migration flows.  Migration scholars studied 
the trends of former Soviet immigrants migrating within the FSU (Korobkov, 2007; Sahadeo, 
2007; Zayonchkovskaya, 2000).  They noted that late Soviet and early post-Soviet migration 
flows were related to ethnic tensions until around 1995.  Ethnic tensions were especially an issue 
with non-titular persons (i.e. Russians in Uzbekistan). However, later (1996 onward) post-Soviet 
flows were more often connected to economic reasons.  Also, research by Agadjanian et al. 
(2008) showed that Europeans in the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan felt less of a 
connection to the country and community and reported that they would more likely emigrate 
permanently than did titular persons.  
All three hypotheses relating to titularity were supported for the Brooklyn sample.  For 
the Nashville sample, the hypotheses for titularity and ethnic discrimination as a push factor and 
titularity and intentions to return to live in one’s country of origin were supported and 
statistically significant.  Non-titular persons more often indicated in both the survey and 
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interview that their reason for leaving was related to, at least in part, experiences of 
discrimination in their country of origin.  Titular immigrants were more likely to indicate on the 
surveys that they would like to return to their country of origin to live someday.  However, the 
interviews revealed that this was often wishful thinking and not a practical option for many.  The 
hypothesis that titular immigrants would more likely and more frequently send remittances was 
not statistically significant for the Nashville sample.  Titular immigrants were more likely than 
non-titular immigrants to send remittances to friends or family.  They also sent them more 
frequently.  Titularity, more than the other categories of inquiry, captures the Soviet 
colonization, and maybe the neocolonization, that has occurred.    
Ethnicity 
Ethnicity is tied to titularity.  Rising nationalism since perestroika/glasnost has 
exacerbated intra-group (interethnic) tensions.  That is, there are tensions within former Soviet 
populations between ethnic groups.  Because the Soviet Union was a colonial empire with Russia 
the colonizing entity, I believed that Russians would be more sensitive to newly independent 
state nationalist rhetoric.  However, my hypothesis that Russians would feel less connected to 
other immigrants from the FSU was not supported by the Brooklyn or Nashville sample. 
Ethnic divisions in the FSU can be divided roughly into the following categories:  
European non-Jewish, Jewish, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian.  Of these FS ethnic categories, 
Asians are the only “non-white” group.  Ethno-racial hierarchies can create problems of 
incorporation for non-white immigrants in the U.S (Portes & Zhou, 1993).  If immigrants feel 
marginalized because of these hierarchies, then they are more likely to take a transnational 
identity (Bloemraad, 2004; Levitt, 2009; Morawska, 2004).  In other words, they are more likely 
to maintain a physical and/or virtual connection to their country of origin while living and being 
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in their country of destination.  Therefore I assumed that non-European ethnic groups would 
report more experiences of discrimination than other groups.  That hypothesis was supported in 
Nashville but not Brooklyn.  This is an important difference to note and was especially striking 
for European non-Jewish and Central Asian ethnic groups.  Geography matters.  Discrimination 
may be much more overt in a mid-southern state, even though Nashville has a relatively large 
immigrant population and is not a monolithically “white” city.  Therefore, the experiences of 
discrimination for immigrants are likely more noticeable in Davidson County than in a more 
multinational, multiethnic county such as Kings.   
Migration scholarship literature refers to a global ethno-racial hierarchy. Bloemraad 
(2004) points out that transnational identities are created because, in part, ethnoracial hierarchies 
can produce feelings of marginalization.  In other words, immigrants are often received in 
countries where they are racialized and relegated to the bottom rungs of the ethno-racial 
hierarchy and do not feel welcomed by that society.  This creates a state of belonging neither 
here nor there.  That non-European ethnic groups would more likely express a transnational 
identity in the form of considering their country of origin as “home” was the only hypothesis 
supported in this group for the Brooklyn sample.  Although I believed this was related more to 
titularity than ethnicity, a logistic regression showed that when titularity was controlled, 
Transcaucasian and Central Asian ethnic were more likely than European non-Jewish and Jewish 
ethnic groups to express a transnational identity.   
“Ethnicity” was a jumping off point to the broader concept of discrimination.  The 
interviews were the most useful source of data to tease out this complex construct.  
Discrimination was experienced and perpetuated based on a number of indicators of difference 
including language ability, gender, ethnicity and religion.  Experiences of discrimination 
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happened either in the country of origin or in the U.S. and ranged in severity.  These experiences 
ranged from feeling unappreciated in one’s workplace (U.S.) to being covered in acid because of 
a religious conversion (country of origin).  Those who experienced discrimination were 
sometimes the perpetrators of it; one example was the Uzbek immigrant in this study who felt 
discriminated against because of his skin color and simultaneously engaged in joking with others 
about “damn Mexican” immigrants in Nashville.   
Social Capital and Migration Theories 
Social capital and migration theories are cornerstones of migration scholarship.  This 
section revisits these theories briefly and offers the insight my research has brought to these 
theories.  Social capital is ever-present.  Among immigrants, it is an important substitute for a 
lack of access to other forms of capital:  economic, cultural, and political.  The former Soviet 
context presents an opportunity to look at how social capital is produced and used differently 
than what is seen in Western societies.  FS populations, in general, rely heavily on informal 
social capital as a result of sociopolitical history of the FS region, which includes a legacy of 
corruption and an hour-glass society.   
The social capital data captured by the surveys show that there are few differences 
between the Brooklyn and Nashville samples when it comes to social capital production and 
utilization.  Feelings of connectedness (1 = Not at all, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = Strongly, 4 = Very 
Strongly) showed no significant statistical differences between the Brooklyn and Nashville 
samples.  The strongest response solicited on average was for feelings of connectedness to the 
U.S. for the Brooklyn (M = 3.19, SD = 0.763) and Nashville (M = 3.18, SD = 0.815) samples.  
The weakest response solicited on feelings of connectedness was to immigrants from countries 
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outside the FSU for the Brooklyn sample (M = 2.12, SD = 0.92) and to one’s local neighborhood 
in the country of origin for the Nashville sample (M = 1.98, SD = 0.965).    
As was covered in the Results section under the hypothesis about refugees and formal 
institutions, the data show that few respondents relied on formal institutional help or were 
engaged in formal institutional activity, but refugees were more likely to rely on formal 
institutions for adjustment purposes than were non-refugees.  Sixty-two percent of the Brooklyn 
sample and 58 percent of the Nashville sample reported reliance on informal institutions for help.  
In other words, immigrants tapped into informal social networks rather than formal social capital 
or other formal capital networks.   
The lack of reliance on formal institutions is striking because the economic struggle FS 
immigrants face is captured by the secondary and primary data from this study.  According to the 
Census data comparisons, FS immigrants as a whole are much more educated than the general 
foreign born population in the U.S, but on average, FS immigrants have experienced higher rates 
of poverty.  The survey data showed that even though the Nashville sample was relatively better 
off than the Brooklyn sample, both groups were below the average median income (AMI).   
There was only one statistically significant difference between the Brooklyn and 
Nashville samples regarding social capital and that was the use of religious institutions for 
support.  Even though only a few Nashville respondents (N=4) relied on a church, synagogue or 
mosque for financial help, none of the respondents in the much larger Brooklyn sample claimed 
this form of help. This finding may be related to the larger role religion plays in local culture and 
human service delivery in the southern U.S, but no conclusions can be drawn from such a small 
number.  Another consideration to note is that reliance on formal institutions may have been 
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underreported in the surveys.  I suspect underreporting because the interviews revealed there was 
an overall negative attitude towards using any type of welfare benefits.   
Another difference regarding informal social capital relates to the spatial dispersion of FS 
immigrants in Nashville versus the relative concentration of FS immigrants in Brooklyn.  This 
reality was revealed through GIS mapping of both research sites.  It may be harder to engage in 
informal social capital production for immigrants who do not live in enclaves, but, as reviewed 
above, the sample comparison analysis showed no real differences between the Brooklyn and 
Nashville samples regarding feelings of connectedness to other immigrants from FS republics. 
Furthermore, when considering the building of formal or informal social capital, it is important 
to consider the role of trust.  Aberg (2000) notes the importance of “accumulated trust” as a 
foundation for the production of social capital.  With a FS population, or any immigrant 
population, it is important to consider the context from which they are coming.  Several 
respondents noted the corruption of the government in former Soviet states and that may account 
for their lack of trust in the government or other formal institutions for help.  Coming from 
communities where interpersonal trust may or may not have been established may also affect the 
production of informal social capital.  
Migration theories 
The theoretical domain of migration scholarship is very well developed.  Push/pull 
theories of migration capture a range of driving factors behind the initiation of migration 
including income maximization (neoclassical economics), risk minimization (new economics of 
migration), labor market structure (dual labor market), exploration (the sojourn), involuntary 
conditions (forced migration), and globalization (world systems).  Migration patterns emerge 
because of community and family relationships (network), formal and informal institutional 
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relationships (institutional), existing migration (cumulative causation), and globalization 
(migration systems).   
Push/Pull theories.  The reasons for migration cited by my respondents ranged from 
economic to forced reasons.  Liebert (2010) cited economic motivations as the main reasons for 
migration among her Central Asian.  Economic motivation as a strong driving force for 
migration also was supported by my research. Figures 4 and 5 show the pooled Brooklyn and 
Nashville breakdown of reasons for emigration and immigration reported by my respondents as 
captured by the survey.  Respondents could choose multiple reasons.  The most frequently cited 
pull factor was to experience life somewhere else.  But a close second was that there was no 
economic future in the immigrant’s country of origin.  The most frequently cited (pooled) pull 
factor was the prospect of a better education for the immigrant or the immigrant’s child(ren). The 
next most frequently cited (pooled) pull factor was the expected potential to make more money 
in the U.S. than elsewhere.   
There were interesting differences between the Brooklyn and Nashville samples. In 
Brooklyn and Nashville, the top reason cited for leaving one’s country of origin (push factor) 
was the desire to experience life elsewhere.  For both samples, the second most cited reason was 
that there was no economic future in one’s country of origin (Nashville = 37%; Brooklyn = 
50%). The pull reason differences were most interesting.  Sixty-five percent of the Brooklyn 
sample indicated they wanted a better educational opportunity for one’s self or child as opposed 
to 39 percent of the Nashville sample.   What is it about the geographic or sample selection 
context that created these differences?   The only explanation that emerged from these data was 
the statistically significant difference between levels of education for the Brooklyn and Nashville 
sample.  In Nashville, 28% of respondents had a graduate degree versus only 4 percent in 
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Brooklyn.  That could mean that because almost a third of the Nashville sample had an advanced 
degree, educational opportunities did not factor into their migration decision-making process.  It 
could also mean that those who chose to immigrate to Brooklyn may have done so in part 
because they believed educational opportunities would be greater there than elsewhere.  
However, the statement about the educational opportunity was not just for oneself but for one’s 
child or children.  Therefore, it is not clear what these differences may mean.   
Interviews revealed that the non-economic reasons for migration were especially 
prominent among non-titular immigrants who did not feel at home in their countries of origin.  
However, those immigrants with refugee status, who would fit under the forced migration theory, 
elucidated the complex reasons for migration, and showed why singular theories of migration are 
limited.  For example, a refugee living in Brooklyn who cited that he and his wife experienced 
discrimination in Uzbekistan because his wife is Russian noted that there were strong economic 
incentives for moving to the U.S.  
Figure 9:  Reasons for emigrating from country of origin (% of sample – could choose all that applied) 
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Figure 10: Reasons for immigrating to U.S. (% of sample - could choose all that apply). 
 
Incorporation theories.   
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origin (transnationalism).  Time-space compression means that the space between two points is 
made smaller because of advances in technology.   In other words, an immigrant may live 
thousands of miles away from the city she grew up in, Kiev, but she can travel there physically 
within 24 hours by plane.  He can get the latest news on what is happening on the political scene 
in Georgia immediately by internet and Skype with his friends and family in Tbilisi on a regular 
basis. This time-space compression concept is incorporated in my ecological model below.  
Experiences of discrimination can be one of the toughest obstacles to deal with in a new 
country and culture.  Well over half of all of my respondents (60 percent) reported that they 
never felt discriminated against in the U.S. based on their ethnicity.  But experiences of 
discrimination differed between the Nashville and Brooklyn samples. An overwhelming majority 
(70 percent) of the Brooklyn sample claimed to have never felt discriminated against versus only 
35 percent of the Nashville sample.     
New Mainstream Theory of migration is helpful to decipher the majority of interviews I 
conducted.  While respondents often talked of not caring about the ethnicity of their friends, 
those who talked in length about their intimate friendships described them as being with persons 
from their countries of origin or who shared the same language.  But these same respondents also 
adapted to American norms and culture.  Those living in Nashville were more often forced to 
adapt to American culture and institutions because there are not the plentiful options of former 
Soviet cultural institutions in Nashville as there are in Brooklyn.   
Transnationalism became an increasingly compelling theory for this research project.  
Transnational acts are a way of staying connected, but they may encourage insularity.  There is a 
paradox of engagement via transnationalism.  It helps one stay connected but might also 
facilitate isolation.  A Ukrainian immigrant talked at length about her attachment to Ukraine. She 
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was so attached that she spoke of her home city, Kiev, as if it were a person.  She had a drastic 
response to the changes of her city when she revisited it.  Attachment theory may be a helpful 
theory to include under the incorporation umbrella category of migration theory.  It is especially 
important to consider how disruptions in place attachment occur because of the migration 
process (Brown and Perkins, 1992).     
The results of my research show some support for multiple theories of migration.  There 
is the seduction of simplification with “catch-all” theories of migration, but using a global theory 
is problematic.  In the case of this study, I am critical of those who simplify the language used to 
refer to immigrants from former Soviet republics. The use of “Russians” by scholars and non-
scholars alike inadvertently perpetuates the Russian colonization of the former Soviet region.    
Therefore, I believe it is best to be theoretically pluralistic in migration scholarship.  
More specifically, what push/pull and incorporation theories of migration are missing are 
theories related to titularity.  Both umbrella categories of migration could benefit from the 
development of such theories.  My data show that titularity is relevant to the migration decision 
and the processes/experiences of incorporation.   This is not limited to the FSU as a region of 
origin.  A Colombian immigrant living in Mexico who immigrates to the US or an Algerian 
immigrant from France may also leave their countries of origin and experience incorporation 
differently than titular immigrants from their countries of origin.  Considering titularity forces 
one to expand one’s view of migration.  In short, a postmodernist view of immigration may be 
the most beneficial approach.  To that end, a postmodern model is offered below as a potentially 
helpful tool to better understand the immigration experience.   
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Nashville versus Brooklyn 
 Data were collected in two very different contexts: a new versus old destination of 
immigration.  As was established in the methods section using peer reviewed literature 
(Cornfield et al., 2003; Donato et al., 2008; Lotspeich, Fix, Ost, & Perez-Lopez, 2003; Massey 
and Capoferro, 2008) and Census data, the U.S South, and more specifically Nashville, is a new 
destination for the foreign-born population.  Nashville’s foreign born population increased by 
more than 200 percent between 1990 and 2000 (Lotspeich, Fix, Ost, & Perez-Lopez, 2003; 
Cornfield et al., 2003).  Between 2000 and 2010, the city’s foreign-born population increased 
from 7 percent to 12 percent of the total population.  In Kings County during the same time 
period, the foreign-born population as a percentage of the total population held steady at 38 
percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey).   
 Contrasting two fundamentally different immigrant contexts for research might shed 
light on the continuity, or lack thereof, of theories about a particular immigrant population.  If a 
hypothesis is supported in both sites, that could create a compelling argument about the nature of 
a population.  For my hypotheses, the Nashville sample generally mirrored what was found with 
the Brooklyn sample, even if there was not enough power to achieve statistical significance.  As 
noted above, there was a telling difference.  That difference was what was found when testing for 
experiences of discrimination.  A much higher percentage of the Nashville sample had 
experienced discrimination than did the Brooklyn sample.  This is an important finding in that it 
implies that if refugees, for example, are being resettled in new immigrant destinations were the 
foreign-born population is not well established, they may experience more discrimination than 
they would in a place that is more accustomed to foreign-born persons.  Also, Nashville and 
Brooklyn were statistically compared in a number of demographic and social areas.  The 
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demographic and social differences between samples are worth noting because, for the most part, 
the hypotheses tested in each site were in the same direction.   
 The mean year immigrated differed for Brooklyn and Nashville and the difference was 
statistically significant.  The mean year for Brooklyn (1999) was more recent than for Nashville 
(1996).  That may seem strange as Nashville is noted as a “new” immigrant destination, but what 
this may mean is not how well established or “new” an immigrant destination is, but how active 
that immigrant destination may be.  Brooklyn is still a very active destination for newly arriving 
immigrants.  Also, the difference in the FSU immigrant income as a percentage of the area 
median income (AMI) was statistically significant for both sites.  It was 67 percent for Brooklyn 
and 87 percent for Nashville.  While immigrants in neither location are faring very well 
economically, they are relatively better off in Nashville. 
 Another important social characteristic difference was titularity.  A larger percentage of 
the Nashville sample (80 percent) than the Brooklyn sample (56 percent) was titular.  Not 
surprisingly, then, a larger percentage of the Brooklyn sample (56 percent) than the Nashville 
sample (24 percent) had refugee status at some point in their migration process.  Education was 
another contrasting variable.  A larger percentage of the Brooklyn sample (15 percent versus 2 
percent) had a technical degree, but a much larger percentage of the Nashville sample (28 
percent versus 4 percent) had a graduate degree.  Finally, religion contrasted.  In Brooklyn, a 
higher percentage of the sample was Jewish (24 percent versus 7 percent).  In Nashville, a higher 
percentage claimed no religion or atheism (22 percent versus 8 percent).  Another point about 
religion is the finding on what types of formal institutions were used for adjustment needs.  None 
of the Brooklyn sample relied on a religious institution.  Although only a few in Nashville (N=4) 
relied on a religious institution, this may imply that in new destinations (i.e. the U.S. South), 
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faith-based organizations and religious institutions are more likely to be a source of help for 
immigrants than they are in other geographic areas of the U.S.   
Ecology of Immigration 
In academia and in the public, a contextually rich framework can be beneficial to better 
understand the motivations, needs and overall experiences of immigrants.  The ecological 
framework forces one to consider the individual in context and to look at immigration at multiple 
levels of abstraction, from the everyday experiences of immigrants to how macrostructural 
processes affect experiences and perceptions.  The ecology of immigration model (Figure 11) is 
an adaptation of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model of human development (Bronfenbrenner, 
1979; Bronfenbrenner and Ceci, 1994). It is adapted to lay out an ecology of experience for 
immigrants.  Bronfenbrenner’s model consists of different systems an individual experiences, or 
is affected by, over the life course. With the individual at the center of the model, the radiating 
systems include the most immediate system to the individual, the microsystem (family and 
immediate peers) and then what Bronfenbrenner terms “external systems” (Bronfenbrenner, 
1986a), which include the mesosystem (buffer or interactional space between systems), 
exosystem (formal institutions, mass media), and macrosystem (culture, political economy).  The 
chronosystem was added after the original ecological model was developed and includes 
sociohistorical and lifecourse events (Bronfenbrenner, 1986b; Bronfenbrenner and Ceci, 1994).  
Bronfenbrenner developed this model to look at a child’s development, but that concept easily 
can be transferred to other individuals, regardless of age.   
My adapted model is split into two spheres because there are at least two significant 
geographic spaces for an immigrant:  country of origin and country of destination.  There may be 
multiple countries of origin or destination, but this model is limited to two spheres. It takes into 
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account the context from which they came in their country of origin and juxtaposes it to the 
context in which they are in the country of destination.  An immigrant’s “ecology” shifts through 
migration.   
There are multiple system levels to consider and those shape the experiences of 
immigrants.  In this study, there were examples of immigrants not trusting formal institutions in 
the U.S. solely based on their experience with corrupt institutions in their countries of origin.  An 
immigrant’s engagement in each sphere can be static or dynamic depending on actions, 
expressions and beliefs.  Transnationalism is a relatively new discussion point for migration 
scholarship, partly because historically, transnational acts were not as feasible as they are today.  
Transnational acts can be engaged in more actively because of what Harvey (1991) referred to as 
time-space compression, as defined above.  Time-space compression facilitates connectivity.  
How one engages in transnationalism has changed with time.  The advent of technology and 
relative ease of travel helps one stay more connected to their country of origin.   But that does 
not mean one becomes unconnected from their country of destination or local community.  It 
brings the geographic spheres of experience closer together for immigrants and, subsequently, 
communities surrounding the immigrant.  This model compiles the complexity of the immigrant 
experience into a snapshot of understanding and might be helpful in future research to create a 
more developed understanding of the immigrant experience.  In other words, individual 
experiences may be mapped using this model.  These individuals’ experiences then can be 
applied to a more abstract “immigrant experience.”  Such a model could help construct surveys 
for research.   
The experiences of one of my Brooklyn interview respondents, a titular immigrant from 
Uzbekistan, serves as an example (Table 20).  The organization of just some of his narrative into 
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this model gives a relatively comprehensive snapshot of his experiences, from his family 
dynamics to how he views society.  Most levels of the model are relatively straightforward and 
determined by what the respondent reported.  However, the macrosystem level was not identified 
by the respondent.  I entered what I believed to be relevant macrolevel items based on his 
experiences and perceptions listed at other levels.  For example, Soviet/Russian colonialism is 
included at the macrosystem/country of destination level because he talked at length about the 
difficulties he had because of his marriage to a Russian woman.  These difficulties included 
limited job and educational opportunities for his family, and have been driven by the rise of 
nationalism in several post-Soviet states.   Another macrosystem entry in the table is under the 
country of destination, and that is “limited welfare state.”  That entry was made because the 
respondent spoke about his economic hardship in the U.S.  Part of his struggle is related to the 
limited assistance he receives from the government.  However, he noted that he does get 
government assistance (see exosystem), but believes it is not sufficient to help his family.  Also 
entered at this level on the country of destination side is “democratic society.”  This was entered 
because he spoke about the freedom he reports to enjoy while living in the U.S.   
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Figure 11:  Ecology of Immigration Model 
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Table 20:  An application of the ecology of immigration model 
System Level Interview Notes 
 Country of Origin: Uzbekistan Country of Destination:  US 
Individual 
Male, Uzbek, Muslim.  Left Tashkent at age 
28 for U.S. Worked at paper factory.   
Male, Uzbek, Muslim, 43.  Immigrated 
to US at age 28 (in 1996).  Refugee 
status now citizen. Works in traffic 
control for government.   
   
Microsystem 
Married to a Russian woman.  Had one child 
in Uzbekistan with wife.  Lived in 
neighborhood near family. 
Oldest child in university. Now has 
another child with disability. Still 
married to same Russian woman.  
Other family lives in Uzbekistan. Lives 
in public housing. 
   
Mesosystem 
Believes marriage was looked down upon by 
community.   
Believes community does not judge his 
interethnic marriage.  
   
Exosystem 
Believed daughter did not have economic or 
social future because she was half Russian.   
Received food stamps and still 
receives housing assistance and 
Medicaid.  Looks negatively upon 
public assistance.  
   
Macrosystem 
Russian/Soviet colonialism.  Collapse of 
Soviet Union, independence of Uzbekistan.  
Authoritarian society.   
Limited welfare state.  Democratic 
society.       
   
Engagement. 
Watches news about Uzbekistan. Connects to 
family and friends through phone and internet. 
Does not intend to ever return to Uzbekistan 
to live.     
Wants to remain in U.S. Does not like 
public housing community. Most 
current friends are childhood friends 
who also moved to U.S.   
   
Intervention.  The ecological model might be a helpful tool when considering types of 
intervention needed to better immigrant communities from within or from outside.  The most 
accessible and understandable level for engagement is the individual level.  However, as the 
example above shows, understanding the individual level is incomplete without considering it in 
the context of the different system levels.  For example, if finding employment is something with 
which the immigrant overviewed above needs assistance, then various information at different 
levels might better reveal his needs, capacity and limitations when looking for employment such 
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as the facts that he cares for a special needs child and lives in public housing with his family.  If 
his family is still struggling and needs further public assistance, helping him find community-
based organizations for social support might be more beneficial to him than suggesting other 
government services because of his clear discomfort with government help.  Regardless of the 
intervention involved or suggested, a dynamic understanding of an immigrant’s lived experience 
in both countries of origin and destination can more fully inform intervention efforts.   
Limitations and Strengths 
There are several limitations to this research.  The Nashville data set was quite small and 
could not detect a range of effect sizes.  Although my hypotheses were relatively simple, more 
complicated analysis, such as multivariate analysis, of the data are limited by the sizes of the 
Nashville and Brooklyn samples.  Convenience sampling, though guided by quota sampling, 
limits the generalizability of these findings.  The existing literature sets a limitation in that this 
general population, FS immigrants, has not been well defined or understood.  This lack of a 
better foundation creates a lot of new territory to explore. But the state of the existing literature 
could be considered an opportunity rather than a limitation.   
Another important limitation was the construction of the three categories used to guide 
this research.  The a priori categories for research were refugee status, titularity and ethnicity.  A 
better third category would have been “identity” instead of “ethnicity.”  This would have 
produced better hypothesis options to test as identity better encapsulates the experiences of 
discrimination based on a wide range of indicators of difference, such as gender, religion, accent, 
and so on.  Engagement with identity literature and theories would have helped my research 
design and analysis.  Engagement with gender is also limited in this research.  It came up 
occasionally, but as I explained in the Results section, I believe the special case of gender history 
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in the Soviet period and the dynamic social changes that have occurred as a result of the collapse 
of the USSR create the need for a completely separate research project devoted to the study of 
gender.  I also regret that I did not better capture occupation statuses in country of origin and the 
U.S. as deskilling emerged as an interesting theme in the interviews.   
Despite the limitations of this research, there are several strengths.  They include a use of 
mixed methods of inquiry at two vastly different research sites among a population that has been 
difficult for scholars to access.  Even though I note the limitations of my sampling method 
above, I was able to find multiple points of entry so that my samples did not represent just one 
“stream” of the population at each site.  Though limited, the sample sizes were large enough to 
run statistical analyses, which provided support for most of my hypotheses.  Using secondary 
data along with primary data yielded a more complete portrait of FS immigrants living in the 
U.S. and confirmed some of the primary data findings, such as the economic struggle of this 
immigrant population despite their high levels of formal education.   
Future Research and Implications 
My research was intended for three broad audiences who may conduct inquiry among or 
work with or on behalf of FS immigrants:  migration scholars, non-migration scholars and 
government and non-profit staff.  For migration scholars, this research gives rise to several topics 
for future research projects.  More research is needed on the institutional engagement of 
immigrants based on their specific legal status.  Scholars might consider shifting their lens to 
regions of origin rather than just counties of origin.  In the case of this research, the use of the 
FSU as a unit encouraged a pluralistic understanding of the population.  In this vein, titularity is 
an especially relevant topic of inquiry.  Titularity as a unit of analysis and/or moderating variable 
further reveals the plurality of immigrant populations.  Titularity might also be a helpful 
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contextual anchor for non-migration scholars.  If, for example, educational research is being 
conducted among immigrant youth, researchers would do well to consider the youth and family’s 
titular status and their experiences in their country of origin.  More research is needed into the 
nuances of identity and what that means for decisions to migrate and incorporation into a new 
society.  For migration and non-migration scholars, an ecological framework could be a helpful 
tool to use for inquiry for any immigrant population.   
 One of my hopes is that scholars and non-scholars alike will rethink how they define and 
conceptualize immigrant populations, especially persons from former Soviet republics.   
Government and non-government organizations that might interact or work with this population 
should understand that they are not all Russian and that ethnicity and country of origin matter.  
Sensitivity to ethnic distinctions may help build trust.  Understanding discrimination among 
“white” immigrants can help diversify an understanding of the motivations and processes of 
discrimination.  It is not just the ethno-racial hierarchy that matters when it comes to 
discrimination.  What are the indicators of difference that produce discrimination towards 
immigrants?  My research shows that geographic context matters. Even though Nashville is 
becoming more multicultural, immigrants continue to feel the sting of discrimination.  This could 
help the government better understand what immigrants might face in particular refugee 
resettlement locations.   
My research hints towards the importance of allowing immigrants access to legal status.  
Current immigration reform offers a path to citizenship, but the new legislation has not yet 
passed the House chamber.  If a path to citizenship is not offered, then perhaps a different 
approach, such as a path to legality (permanent residency) will make immigrants less vulnerable 
to ineffective institutions.  I cannot address the economic implications of undocumented 
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immigrants in the U.S., but I can give some insight into their vulnerability.  In my limited 
sample, I interviewed a former victim of trafficking and an undocumented construction worker, 
both of whom showed how legal status affects the vulnerability of an immigrant.  The trafficking 
victim was a legal immigrant (now a citizen) and even though her cry for help to a human rights 
organization fell on deaf ears, she was able to find other work because of her legal status.  
Conversely, the undocumented worker I spoke to had to get help from his already financially 
burdened Georgian family when he injured himself at work.  Furthermore, very few immigrants 
from the FSU are inclined to turn to formal institutions for help, so they rely on informal 
institutions.  This increases their vulnerability.  An uncertain legal status further exacerbates this 
vulnerability.   
One of the more important outcomes from this research is the creation of a website9.  It 
includes the results from this study, helpful resources for immigrants, and a link to the survey 
used in the study so that I may continue data collection.  The website will be promoted by word 
of mouth, social media, and editorial announcements in Russian-language newspaper published 
in the U.S. My hope is that it will be useful for newly arriving immigrants who are still trying to 
orient themselves to life in the U.S.  
Conclusion 
The original research question was “To what extent does a Soviet legacy shape the 
experiences of FS immigrants living in the U.S.?”  The Soviet Empire did more than expand 
Russia’s colonization of surrounding areas, it colonized the world’s imagination of the Soviet 
Union.  It continues to shape a perception about what the Soviet Union was and what the former 
Soviet region continues to be.   
                                                           
9 www.fsimmigrants.com 
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The major contribution of this dissertation is to present a decolonized understanding of 
the immigrant population from former Soviet republics.  Unlike “Russian,” “Soviet” is not a 
language, ethnicity, or even much of an identity.  It refers to a political and economic system and 
also a period during which Russia extended its empire and expanded its culture and influence.  It 
may seem odd to maintain the FSU as a region of origin in 21st century scholarship, but the 
Soviet period is relevant in this current period of globalization because it helps to capture the 
inextricable legacy of Russia in its surrounding region and the transcendence of Russian 
nationalism in post-Soviet space.  As global migration hyper-accelerates, a regional 
understanding becomes more important to migration scholarship – in geographical and 
sociohistorical terms.   
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Appendix A 
Research Matrix with Literature and Theories 
 
Individual 
Status 
Potential 
Problem 
Hypothesis 
Corresponding Literature/ 
Theory 
Specific measures/ 
questions 
Refugee 
Incorporation/ 
Adjustment 
H1:  Refugees from the FSU rely on formal 
institutions (such as government programs, community 
organizations, and religious institutions) after 
immigration while non-refugees rely on informal 
institutions (such as friends and family members) after 
immigration.   
 
Neoclassical and institutional 
migration theories (Borjas, 1994; 
Liebert, 2010) 
Interview question: 30; 
Survey questions:  9, 23 
Titularity 
Post-Colonial 
Issues 
H2:  Non-titular immigrants are more likely to report 
experiences of ethnic discrimination as a reason for 
leaving their country of origin than titular immigrants.    
 (Korobkov, 2007; Sahadeo, 
2007; Zayonchkovskaya, 2000); 
Forced migration theory; 
Neoclassical migration theory 
(Todaro, 1969) 
Interview Questions: 3, 4, 
6, 15, 35; Survey 
Questions: 2, 5, 18 
  
H3:  Titular immigrants will more likely be temporary 
immigrants and intend to return home to live.   
The sojourn migration theory 
(Agadjanian et al., 2008; 
Hamilton, 1985.) 
Interview Questions: 3, 6, 
16; Survey Questions: 2, 5, 
24 
  
H4:  Titular immigrants are more likely to send 
remittances to their country of origin and they remit 
more frequently than non-titular immigrants. 
New economics of migration 
theory (Stark & Bloom, 1985) 
Interview Questions: 3, 6, 
21; Survey Questions: 2, 5, 
26 
  
H5:  Russians feel less connected to other immigrants 
from the FSU than non-Russians. 
Russia as dominant republic/ 
cultural/ ethnic group during 
Soviet era 
Interview Questions: 6, 32; 
Survey Questions: 5, 20 
Ethnicity Discrimination 
H6a:  Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to 
report discrimination in the U.S. based on ethnicity. 
 
Assimilation/acculturation 
theories of incorporation (Portes 
& Zhou, 1993) Transnationalism 
theory of incorporation 
(Bloemraad, 2004; Levitt, 2009; 
Morawska, 2004) 
Interview Questions: 6, 17, 
26, 34; Survey Questions: 
5, 16, 21 
    
H6b: Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to 
express a transnational identity.  (Transnational 
identity = country of origin is "home.") 
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Appendix B:  Survey 
 
1. Gender:    Male                Female 
 
2. Country of Birth:____________________________ 
 
3. Country you lived in before moving to the United States (Country of 
Origin)__________________________ 
 
4. What type of area did you live in?      Urban       Semi-urban    Rural    
 
5.  Ethnicity___________________________________ 
 
6. Year of birth:________________________________ 
 
7. Year immigrated to the U.S.____________________ 
 
8.  Which county do you currently live in?   Kings County (Brooklyn)       Davidson County 
(Nashville) 
 
9. When you entered the U.S., did you have refugee status or later get asylum status?        Yes       
 No 
 
10.  Did your entire household move with you to the U.S.?                    Yes        No 
 
11.  In your lifetime, how many times have you moved to a new country? __________ 
 
12.  What is the highest level of education you reached? 
 Less than Secondary School/Vocational School          Graduated from Secondary School            
 Attended Technical College                                         Graduated from Technical College         
 Attended University              Graduated from University                 Attended Post-
Graduate School 
 Graduated from Post-Graduate School                         
Other________________________________ 
 
12a. In what year did you reach this?______________________________ 
 
13. Religious affiliation:     
 Christian (Orthodox)        Christian (Other)       Jewish       Muslim       
 Atheist/Not Religious     Other________________________________ 
 
14. Current occupation:  
 Business Owner           Clerical/Administration          Construction      Farming/Forestry  
 Manager/Executive      Manufacturing           Professional       Sales         Service   
  Student      Other _________________________ 
 
15. Occupation in country of origin: 
 127 
 
 Business Owner           Clerical/Administration          Construction      Farming/Forestry  
 Manager/Executive      Manufacturing           Professional       Sales         Service   
  Student      Other _________________________ 
 
16. The country I consider to be my home is:  _________________________________________ 
 
17. My current immigration status is: U.S. Citizen          Permanent Resident            Other 
 
18. I left my country because (please check all that apply): 
a. I wanted to experience life somewhere else.  Yes        No 
b. I was persecuted/negatively treated because of my: 
  Ethnicity        Religion     Political Beliefs        
  I did not feel persecuted/negatively treated       
c. My country is corrupt and I wanted to leave     Yes        No 
d. I did not have an economic future in my country  Yes        No 
e. My family moved away      Yes        No 
f. My friends moved away     Yes        No 
g. Other:  ____________________________________________ 
 
19. I moved to the United States because (please check all that apply): 
a. I could make more money here than in my country of origin    Yes       No 
b. I wanted better educational opportunities for me (or my children)   Yes       No 
c. I had/have family members here        Yes       No 
d. I had/have friends here         Yes       No 
e. I came here as a visitor and eventually became an immigrant    Yes       No 
f. I did not want to move to the U.S but I had no choice       Yes       No 
 If yes, please explain_______________________________________________________ 
 f. Other:  ________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. How strongly do you feel connected to: Very 
Strongly 
Strongly Somewhat Not at all 
Country of Origin 1 2 3 4 
Local Neighborhood in Country of Origin 1 2 3 4 
The United States 1 2 3 4 
Local Neighborhood in the United States 1 2 3 4 
Other immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the U.S? 1 2 3 4 
Other immigrants from other countries in the U.S? 1 2 3 4 
Americans 1 2 3 4 
 
21. Do you feel discriminated against in the U.S. because of your ethnicity? 
 All the time          Sometimes           Rarely       Never    
 
 
 
 
22. I am an active member of my local: 
 Church/Synagogue/Mosque          Political Club/Group 
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Community Organization (Neighborhood Group, YMCA, etc.)      School/University 
 Recreational Club (like chess, reading, cooking, etc.)      Other: ___________________   
 
23.  When you immigrated to the U.S., which of the following did you rely on for financial or 
other types of help (check all that apply): 
 U.S. Government              State Government               Local or State 
Government 
 Church/Synagogue/Mosque         Community/Non-Profit Organization 
 Family                          Friends                                     Other: 
___________________   
 
24.  I intend to return to live in my country of origin someday.    Yes       No 
 
25.  I intend to live permanently in the U.S.       Yes       No 
 
26.  I send money back home to my family and/or friends in my country of origin (approximately): 
Once a month      A few times a year      Once a year       Once every few years       Never 
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Appendix C 
Semi-structured Interview Guide 
 
Demographic Questions: 
1. Age 
 
2. Gender  
 
3. Country of Origin 
 
4. Year of 
entry 
5. Current immigration status (if 
you are comfortable telling me) 
 
6. Ethnicity/Nationality 
 
7. Religion 
 
8. Highest level of education 
completed 
 
9. Are you married?   
 
10. Please describe who is living in your 
household. 
 
 
11. Does some of your family still live in 
(country of origin)? If so, who? Were they a 
part of your HH when you lived in (COO)? 
12. Current place of employment  
 
13. Place of employment in country of origin. 
 
 
 
14. Why did you immigrate to the U.S.? 
 
15. Why did you leave (country of origin)? 
 
16.  Do you intend to return home to (country of origin) to live or do you intend to stay in the 
U.S.?  
 
17. When you think of home, where is it for you? 
 
18. Describe where you are from (country, city, village, neighborhood). 
 
19. How do you feel about (your country of origin) today? 
 
20. How do you stay connected to your country of origin?  (country, friends/family, other)? 
 
21. Do you support anyone in (country of origin) with money earned here?  (What can you tell 
me about that?) 
 
22. What expectations/perceptions did you have before you moved to the U.S.? 
 
23. What was hard for you when you moved to the U.S.? 
• How did you cope with that? 
 
24. What do you like about living in the U.S.? 
 
 
25. What do you think are the main differences between the U.S. and (your country of origin)? 
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26. How do you think you are perceived by Americans? 
 
27. Are you satisfied with your life in the U.S.?  Why/Why not? 
 
28. Do you feel like you belong to any community here in the U.S or in (city)? If so, could you 
name that community and describe it to me.  If not, why not? 
 
29. Who are your friends? 
 
30. Who do you rely on for help?   
• Can you rely on anyone or anything else for help?   
 
31. Are you active in any organization or group? (civic, social, political, religious – please 
describe each) 
 
32. How do you feel about other immigrants from the former Soviet Union? 
 
33. How do you feel about other immigrants in general living in the U.S? 
 
34. Do you ever feel discriminated against here?  How and why do you think it happens? 
 
35. Did you ever feel discriminated against in (your country of origin)? How and why did you 
think it happened? 
 
36. What do you remember about the Soviet Union? 
• What do you tell your children? 
• What do you tell others? 
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Appendix D 
Correlation Results 
  
  
How 
strongly 
connected 
to country 
of origin 
How 
strongly 
connected 
to local 
neigh in 
country of 
origin 
How 
strongly 
connected 
to the US 
How 
strongly 
connected 
to local 
neigh US 
How 
strongly 
connected 
to other 
immigrants 
from FSU 
How 
strongly 
connected 
to other 
immigrants 
from other 
countries 
How 
strongly 
connected 
to 
Americans 
Do you ever 
feel 
discriminated 
in the US 
because of 
your 
ethnicity? 
How many 
times send 
back money 
home to 
family/friends 
in country of 
origin 
Highest level of education 
reached? 
-.041 -.058 -.015 -.025 -.090 .080 -.098 -.119 .211* 
How strongly connected to 
country of origin 
 .770** -.212* -.125 -.109 .008 -.083 -.014 .405** 
How strongly connected to 
local neigh in country of 
origin 
  -.050 -.026 -.059 .030 -.084 .061 .339** 
How strongly connected to 
the US 
   .495** .140 .087 .491** -.053 .017 
How strongly connected to 
local neigh US 
    .209* .275** .384** -.274** .064 
How strongly connected to 
other immigrants from FSU 
     .625** .220* -.008 -.002 
How strongly connected to 
other immigrants from other 
countries 
      .346** .013 .025 
How strongly connected to 
Americans 
       -.107 .080 
Do you ever feel 
discriminated in the US 
because of your ethnicity? 
                .075 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01 
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Appendix E 
Hypotheses Tests 
H1:  Refugees from the FSU will rely on formal institutions (government programs, community organizations, religious institutions, etc.) for adjustment 
purposes while non-refugees will rely on informal institutions (social networks, family members, etc.) for adjustment purposes. 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Institutional Support   
 Informal Formal   
Non-refugee 52 5 
19.04 0.000 
Refugee 40 31 
 Nashville   
 Institutional Support   
 Informal Formal   
Non-refugee 32 3 
11.241 0.001 
Refugee 5 6 
H2:  Non-titular persons will be more likely to report experiences of ethnic discrimination as a reason for leaving their country of origin than will titular 
persons.  
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 39 19 
16.324 0.000 
Titular 68 4 
 Nashville   
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 4 5 
17.829 0.000 
Titular 36 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H2a:  Non-titular persons who immigrated before 1996 will be more likely to report experiences of ethnic discrimination as a reason for leaving their country 
of origin than will titular persons.  
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 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Immigrated before 1996 23 12 ns ns 
Immigrated in 1996 or later 16 7 
 Nashville   
 Left country because of ethnic discrimination   
 No Yes   
Immigrated before 1996 3 4 
ns ns 
Immigrated in 1996 or later 1 1 
     
H3:  Titular immigrants will more likely be temporary immigrants, intending to return home to live  
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Intend to return to country of origin to live   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 48 6 
6.827 0.009 Titular 47 21 
 Nashville 
 Intend to return to country of origin to live   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 9 0 
4.091 0.043 
Titular 24 12 
H4:  Titular immigrants will more likely and more frequently send remittances to their country of origin than will non-titular immigrants. 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Send Remittances?   
 No Yes   
Non-Titular 31 25 
8.958 0.003 
Titular 21 51 
   
   
   
 Nashville 
 Send Remittances?   
 No Yes   
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Non-Titular 4 5 
ns ns 
Titular 10 26 
 
Sends Remittances to County of Origin:  1=Never, 2=Once every few years, 3=Once a year, 4=A few times a year, 
5=Once a month 
 M SD t-test p 
 Brooklyn   
Non-Titular 2.2 1.5 
-2.728 0.007 
Titular 2.93 1.5 
 Nashville   
Non-Titular 2 1.1 ns ns 
Titular 2.89 1.4 
H5:  Russians will feel less connected to other immigrants from the FSU than will non-Russians 
 
How strongly connected do you feel to other immigrants from FS republics?  1=Very strongly, 2=Strongly, 3=Somewhat, 
4=Not at all 
 M SD t-test p 
 Brooklyn   
Non-Russian 2.54 0.775 
ns ns 
Russian 2.47 0.915 
 Nashville   
Non-Russian 2.64 0.79 
ns ns 
Russian 2.55 0.759 
H6a:  Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to report experiences of discrimination in the U.S. based on ethnicity. 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Have you ever experienced discrimination in U.S. based on ethnicity?    
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 44 18 
ns ns 
Jewish 21 11 
Transcaucasian 17 4 
Central Asian 8 5 
 Nashville   
 Have you ever experienced discrimination in U.S. based on ethnicity?    
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 10 22 7.096 0.05* 
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Jewish 3 1 
Transcaucasian 3 2 
Central Asian 0 5 
H6b:  Non-European ethnic groups are more likely to express a transnational identity.  (Transnational identity = country of origin is "home.") 
 Brooklyn X2 p 
 Country of Origin is "Home"   
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 47 10 
18.615 0.000 
Jewish 31 1 
Transcaucasian 10 8 
Central Asian 6 6 
 Nashville 
 Country of Origin is "Home"   
 No Yes   
European Non-Jewish 18 13 
na ns* 
Jewish 4 0 
Transcaucasian 4 1 
Central Asian 2 3 
*Fisher's exact test     
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